Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness. An analysis of early Latin commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics by Buffon, Valeria
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Philosophers and Theologians on Happiness. An analysis of early Latin commentaries on the
Nicomachean Ethics"
 
Valeria Buffon
Laval théologique et philosophique, vol. 60, n° 3, 2004, p. 449-476.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/011360ar
DOI: 10.7202/011360ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 9 février 2017 03:39
Laval théologique et philosophique, 60, 3 (octobre 2004) : 449-476 
449 
PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS 
ON HAPPINESS 
AN ANALYSIS OF EARLY LATIN COMMENTARIES 
ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 
Valeria Buffon* 
Faculté de philosophie 
Université Laval, Québec 
RÉSUMÉ : Avant 1250, même avec un champ d’études statutairement restreint, les maîtres ès arts de 
Paris abordaient un certain nombre de disciplines philosophiques. Parmi les enseignements 
prescrits à ces maîtres se trouvait l’éthique, étudiée dans l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote. En 
interprétant ce texte, les maîtres ès arts enseignaient ce qu’ils comprenaient comme « bonheur » 
en utilisant un réseau de concepts pas toujours en accord avec celui des théologiens. Autour du 
concept de bonheur, nous tentons ici d’observer les différences et les ressemblances dont 
témoignent — dans le contexte controversé de l’Université de Paris — les ouvrages pertinents 
des maîtres ès arts par rapport à l’opinion des théologiens. 
ABSTRACT : Before 1250, even with a statutorily restricted field of research, the Arts masters of 
Paris included in their teaching a certain number of philosophical disciplines. Courses imposed 
on Arts masters included ethics, using Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Commenting on this text, 
Arts masters would interpret it and teach their own doctrine of “happiness”, involving concepts 
not always in agreement with those of the theologians. Taking into account the controversial 
context of the University of Paris, we focus in this paper on the opinions of Arts masters in both 
their differences and their agreements with the theologians, regarding the concept of happiness. 
______________________  
I. INTRODUCTION 
he examination of a problem that scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries have studied passionately is considered here, namely the differentiation 
between philosophy and theology in the Thirteenth-century University of Paris. This 
inquiry is far from simple because it includes more than just a conventional classifi-
cation of sciences. It depends on a supportive institutional framework such as a 
                                       
 * This paper originated from a research in the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. I am very grateful to 
the institute for the financial support (“Joseph Wey” Fellowship), and to Prof. Lawrence Dewan for his 
precious help and advice. I would like to thank also Prof. Francisco Bertelloni for his continuous support 
and Prof. Claude Lafleur for his useful suggestions. 
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university1 and a corpus of literature that includes justifications and discussions. 
Texts such as the subject of this paper were the product of the activity of masters of 
Arts. In the case of studies carried out at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Paris 
in the thirteenth century, constant allusions are made to the division of sciences along 
with allusions to institutional divisions. This makes the reader think that the 
boundaries between philosophy and theology are just the boundaries between the 
matters studied by theologians and the matters studied by philosophers. But there the 
problem begins. It is not clear what is to be studied by philosophers and what is to be 
studied by theologians, even in the sphere of the University regulations. What 
becomes evident is that not only was philosophy sometimes forbidden for masters of 
Arts, but it was also sometimes not advisable for theologians either. Indeed the 
masters who wrote these texts discuss the different interpretations of philosophical 
questions offered by philosophers and theologians. In most cases, when masters 
distinguish between philosophers’ answers and theologians’ answers to a question, 
they are discussing philosophical matters. To these questions, theologians have given 
their answers and philosophers have given their own. The masters, in turn, present 
both answers, leaving some fundamental issues unsolved.2 
The increasing enthusiasm for philosophy in the second half of the thirteenth 
century has long been an object of study by medievalists. Recently, Claude Lafleur3 
has shown that this enthusiasm was already present in the early thirteenth-century 
works of masters of Arts. These masters of Arts differentiated what philosophers do 
from what theologians do. In several philosophical matters, although they were not 
allowed to teach natural philosophy they would use forbidden texts in the discussions 
of the allowed texts. Nevertheless, they were not supposed to give their own solutions 
to the philosophical problems that they posed. This is why they gave the theologians’ 
answers and the philosophers’ answers, leaving some questions unsolved. 
In discussing the concept of happiness they would introduce several issues con-
nected to ethics. Happiness as the highest good was one of their concerns. This is re-
lated to the discussion of whether one can achieve happiness in this life or not. Con-
nected with this is the importance of virtues in attaining such an end as the highest 
                                       
 1. About the relationship between the division of sciences and the institutional framework, see J.H.J. SCHNEI-
DER, “Wissenschaftseinteilung und Institutionelle Folgen”, in M.J.F.M. HOENEN, J.H.J. SCHNEIDER, 
G. WIELAND, ed., Philosophy and Learning in the Middle Ages, Leiden, Brill (coll. “Education and Society 
in the Middle Ages and Renaissance”, VI), 1995, p. 63-121. 
 2. See Commentary of Paris, below, section IV, 3, “Happiness in life”, p. 470-475. 
 3. C. LAFLEUR, Quatre introductions à la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Textes critiques et étude historique, 
Montréal, Institut d’études médiévales ; Paris, Vrin (coll. “Publications de l’Institut d’études médiévales”, 
XXIII), 1988. Also C. LAFLEUR, “Scientia et ars dans les introductions à la philosophie des maîtres ès arts 
de l’Université de Paris au XIIIe siècle”, in I. CRAEMER-RUEGENBERG and A. SPEER, ed., Scientia und ars 
in Hoch- und Spätmittelalter, Berlin and New York, de Gruyter (coll. “Miscellanea Mediaevalia” XXII, 1), 
1994, p. 45-65. Also see A. DE LIBERA, “Faculté des arts ou Faculté de philosophie ? Sur l’idée de philoso-
phie et l’idéal philosophique au XIIIe siècle”, in L’enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris 
et Oxford, XIIIe et XVe siècles), Actes du colloque international édités par O. WEIJERS et L. HOLTZ, Turn-
hout, Brepols (coll. “Studia Artistarum. Études sur la Faculté des arts dans les Universités médiévales”, 
IV), 1997, p. 429-444. 
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good and also the framework of the soul responsible for putting the virtues into 
practice. 
The present essay is organized according to different approaches necessary to 
grasp the texts. First, a historical approach will provide a picture of the complexity of 
the institutional situation. Then, a philological approach will show the qualities and 
specificities of the texts available to the masters of Arts and of the texts that they pro-
duced. Finally, the philosophical issues that are considered by the masters will be 
analyzed, including methodological matters and the concept of happiness with its 
several relevant aspects. Methodological matters, such as the questions with two an-
swers, are closely related to the concept of happiness. However, it will remain un-
clear which position the masters take, as will be observed, when discussing questions 
such as “whether happiness is possible in this life or not.” Actually, the methodologi-
cal resource of leaving questions unsolved will allow the masters to discuss rather 
freely some delicate issues. 
II. HISTORICAL APPROACH 
The reception of the Aristotelian works in the thirteenth century is surrounded by 
controversial circumstances. As early as 1210,4 Aristotle’s works on natural philoso-
phy and commentaries on them were forbidden to be taught (non legantur) in Paris, 
privately or in public (publice vel secreto). Moreover, in case of disobedience there 
would be excommunication. Five years later, the Cardinal Legate Robert de Courçon 
repeated the prohibition of some of Aristotle’s works together with the prescription of 
some others.5 On the one hand, the text of Courçon prescribes the reading of Aris-
totle’s Logic (together with works of logic by Boethius and Porphyre) and Priscianus’ 
Grammar, as an ordinary course ; on the other hand, it allows teaching the Ethics and 
other books6 only during holidays. Courses on natural philosophy (Libri naturales) 
                                       
 4. H. DENIFLE et É. CHÂTELAIN, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis (CUP), Paris, Delalain, 1889, t. I, 
no 11, p. 70-71 (1210) : “nec libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nec commenta legantur Parisius pu-
blice vel secreto, et hoc sub penae excommunicationis inhibemus.” 
 5. CUP, t. I, no 20, p. 78 : “Et quod legant libros Aristotelis de dialectica tam de veteri quam de nova in scolis 
ordinarie et non ad cursum. Legant etiam in scolis ordinarie duos Priscianos uel alterum ad minus. Non le-
gant in festivis diebus nisi philosophos et rethoricas et quadruvialia, et barbarismum, et ethicam, si placet, 
et quartum topichorum. Non legantur libri Aristotelis de methafisica et de naturali philosophia, nec summe 
de eisdem, aut de doctrina magistri David de Dinant, aut Almarici heretici, aut Mauricii hyspani.” 
 6. The first three books of the ethics are referred to as “de forma” (that means that there is a regulation that 
prescribes their reading) in the compendia of studies of the faculty of Arts. Cf. C. LAFLEUR, avec la colla-
boration de J. CARRIER, “La réglementation ‘curriculaire’ (‘de forma’) dans les introductions à la philoso-
phie et les guides de l’étudiant de la Faculté des arts de Paris au XIIIe siècle : une mise en contexte”, in 
L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIIIe siècle. Autour du « Guide de l’étudiant » du ms. Ripoll 109, 
Actes du colloque international édités, avec un complément d’études et de textes, par C. LAFLEUR avec la 
collaboration de J. CARRIER, index et bibliographie avec l’assistance de L. GILBERT et D. PICHÉ, Turnhout, 
Brepols (coll. “Studia Artistarum. Études sur la Faculté des arts dans les Universités médiévales”, V), 
1997, p. 521-548. For a mention de forma on the Ethics see C. LAFLEUR, avec la collaboration de 
J. CARRIER, “Un instrument de révision destiné aux candidats à la licence de la Faculté des arts de Paris, le 
De communibus artium liberalium (vers 1250 ?)”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, 
5, 3 (1994), p. 154-203, see p. 202, § 284. The other books to be taught on holidays are philosophos (that is 
PLATO’s Timaeus and BOETHIUS’ Consolation of Philosophy), treatises on rhetoric (to which is added the  
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including the Metaphysics and Summe of them were not to be taught ; nor were the 
doctrines of David de Dinant, Almaric de Bènes, or Maurice of Spain.7 Moreover, the 
text of Courçon repeats explicitly excommunication as a punishment for disobedi-
ence.8 
The range of meanings that the verb lego entails permits that the masters interpret 
it as teach but not necessarily as read. By 1225, an anonymous master wrote a trea-
tise on the powers of the soul.9 This means that even if masters did not teach courses 
on Aristotle’s natural philosophy, they did read the texts and studied them privately. 
Thus, even though Aristotle’s works were not taught they definitely were used. 
Moreover, masters used not only the works of Aristotle but also the commentaries of 
Arab philosophers, as argued by Hasse and Gauthier.10 By 1228, there was also a 
warning against the use of philosophy in the Faculty of Theology.11 In 1229, there 
was a strike at the University of Paris due to some “events.” There had been the 
“most awful insults” (atrocissimis injuriis) to members of the University. For that 
reason there would be no courses ; nor could the students or masters live in Paris or in 
the diocese during the strike. Unless the offences were satisfied the strike would last 
for six years.12 The same year the University of Toulouse was founded by the Treaty 
of Paris ; through this university, the church expected to lead the inhabitants of Tou-
                                       
last book of BOETHIUS’ De differentiis topicis — see in n. 5 : quarto topichorum), the quadriuium and 
DONATUS’ Barbarismum (that is the third book of DONATUS’ Ars Maior). Cf. LAFLEUR, “La réglemen-
tation ‘curriculaire’ (‘de forma’)”, p. 523. 
 7. About the identity of this Maurice of Spain, there are different opinions. The editors of the Chartularium 
consider it might be Averroes, reading Mauricii hyspani, as Mauri hyspani (the Spanish Moor). Luca Bian-
chi considers that this reading is not justified. Cf. L. BIANCHI, Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l’Univer-
sité de Paris (XIIIe-XIVe siècles), Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1999, p. 97-98. 
 8. CUP, t. I, no 20, p. 79 : “Ut autem ista inviolabiliter observentur, […] excommunicationis innodavimus.” 
 9. Cf. R.A. GAUTHIER, “Le traité ‘De Anima et de potenciis eius’ d’un maître ès arts (vers 1225)”, Revue des 
sciences philosophiques et théologiques, 66 (1982), p. 3-55. 
 10. Cf. R.A. GAUTHIER, “Notes sur les débuts (1225-1240) du premier ‘averroïsme’”, Revue des sciences 
philosophiques et théologiques, 66 (1982), p. 321-374. D.N. HASSE, Avicenna’s De Anima in the Latin 
West : The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160-1300, London, The Warburg Institute 
(coll. “Warburg Institute studies and texts”, I), 2000, p. 34-36. See also Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 
lat. 3804a, f. 152vb. 
 11. Cf. J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN, Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris 1200-1400, Philadelphia, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Press (coll. “Middle Ages series”), 1998. See also CUP, t. I, no 59, p. 114-116. Re-
lated to this, L. Dewan presents an “averroist” text, De potentiis anime et obiectis, of an Oxford theolo-
gian ; cf. L. DEWAN, “Obiectum. Notes on the Invention of a Word”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et lit-
téraire du Moyen Âge, 48 (1981), p. 37-96, see specially p. 52-64 ; and GAUTHIER, “Notes sur les débuts”, 
p. 335-336, considers that De potentiis anime et obiectis has influenced on Paris theologians such as Philip 
the Chancellor and John of La Rochelle. In any case, the Paris theologians were using Averroes directly ; 
cf. ibid., p. 340-366. 
 12. CUP, t. I, no 62, p. 118 : “Nos dati provisores ab Universitate communi assensu et voluntate ita ordinamus, 
quod nisi infra mensem a die Pasche competenter fuerit satisfactum universitati magistrorum et scholarium 
secundum nostrum arbitrium super atrocissimis injuriis a preposito Parisiensi et complicibus suis et qui-
busdam aliis eis illatis, extunc nulli liceat morari in civitate vel diocesi Parisiensi causa studii, scilicet au-
diendi vel docendi, infra sex annos a fine predicti mensis numerandos : et pendente termino emende nullus 
leget publice vel privatim. Nec etiam post sex annos poterit quisquam reverti, nisi super predictis injuriis 
competenter fuerit satisfactum.” 
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louse to orthodoxy.13 Curiously, shortly after, a letter was sent from the University of 
Toulouse inviting the masters of Paris to move to Toulouse where the libri naturales 
were not forbidden.14 This may have caused the migration of many masters and stu-
dents to Toulouse during the strike. The prohibition on the libri naturales at Toulouse 
would not appear until 1245.15 
By 1231 Pope Gregory IX, not so concerned about the exodus of masters to 
Toulouse but mostly about the use of the libri naturales in the Faculty of Theology, 
reopened the debate in the bull Parens Scientiarum.16 First, he absolved or allowed 
the bishops to absolve those excommunicated by the 1210-1215 Regulations.17 This 
fact is crucial because without punishment no regulation would have the same 
strength, since the power of a law accompanies the punitive element. Second, he for-
bade the masters of Arts to use the libri naturales and he advised the masters of The-
ology, not to use philosophy and not to show themselves as philosophers.18 He al-
lowed the teaching on natural philosophy once the books had been purged of all 
doctrinal errors ; a Commission would be named to carry out such a task.19 Third, he 
allowed the faculty of Arts to rule about the way in which they would have to dress as 
well as in which way and at what time courses were to be taught and even what books 
were to be read in class.20 In addition, he gave to the Faculty the power of punishing 
all those who did not follow its prescriptions. Finally, a further problem : Gregory IX 
did not abrogate the previous regulations of 1210-1215.21 Therefore, there were two 
contradictory regulations in force at the same time. 
As the masters wrote between 1230 and 1246, they were within the frame pro-
vided by the bull Parens Scientiarum, because there would not be a new syllabus un-
                                       
 13. Cf. C.E. SMITH, The University of Toulouse in the Middle Ages : Its Origins and Growth to 1500 AD, Mil-
waukee, The Marquette University Press, 1958, chap. 2, p. 32-33. 
 14. CUP, t. I, no 72, p. 131 : “Libros naturales, qui fuerant Parisius prohibiti, poterunt illic audire qui volunt 
nature sinum medullitus perscrutari.” 
 15. Cf. BIANCHI, Censure et liberté intellectuelle, p. 108-109. 
 16. A rigorous analysis of this bull, by which this one is inspired, can be found in BIANCHI, Censure et liberté 
intellectuelle, p. 103-116. 
 17. CUP, t. I, no 79. 
 18. CUP, t. I, no 79, p. 138 : “Ad hec jubemus, ut magistri artium […] libris illis naturalibus, qui in Concilio 
provinciali ex certa causa prohibiti fuere, Parisius non utantur, quousque examinati fuerint et ab omni erro-
rum suspitione purgati. Magistri vero et scholares theologie in facultate quam profitentur se studeant lau-
dabiliter exercere, nec philosophos se ostentent, sed satagant fieri theodocti, […] sed de illis tantum in sco-
lis questionibus disputent, que per libros theologicos et sanctorum patrum tractatus valeant terminari.” My 
emphasis. 
 19. CUP, t. I, no 87, p. 143. On April 23, the members were named : William of Auxerre, Symon of Alteis and 
Steven of Provins. 
 20. CUP, t. I, no 79, p. 137 : “Cancellarius quoque jurabit, quod consilia magistrorum in malum eorum nullate-
nus revelabit, Parisiensibus canonicis libertate ac jure in incipiendo habitis in sua manentibus firmitate. 
[…] Ceterum quia ubi non est ordo, facile repit horror, constitutiones seu ordinationes providas faciendi de 
modo et hora legendi et disputandi, de habitu ordinato, de mortuorum exequiis necnon de bachellariis, qui 
et qua hora et quid legere debeant, ac hospitiorum taxatione seu etiam interdicto, et rebelles ipsis constitu-
tionibus vel ordinationibus per subtractionem societatis congrue castigandi, vobis concedimus facultatem.” 
 21. BIANCHI has noticed this, Censure et liberté intellectuelle, p. 103-116. 
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til 1252 (for the English nation) and 1255 (for the entire Faculty of Arts).22 Since the 
frame itself is controversial, the works of the commentators may have carried the 
same controversy. Actually, they had been using but not teaching Aristotle’s natural 
philosophy. How was this possible ? Masters did not teach courses on Aristotle’s 
natural philosophy, but they included their readings on Aristotle in the courses they 
gave, as will be observed. With this new regulation, Gregory IX allowed them to 
teach whatever they wanted ; but they could not use the works until the latter had 
been purged or corrected. How did they assimilate this Regulation, if at all ? To find 
out in the texts what was used along with the books of Ethics to organize the knowl-
edge of Aristotle in a systematic, coherent framework is one of the aims of the pre-
sent paper. Masters were not just repeating theories while they taught ; that is why 
they presented several “theoretical constructions” of their own, as will be discussed 
below. As for the facts, they kept studying the books (since there was no sanction 
against studying them) in order to be ready to teach them when they were allowed. 
They eventually became familiar with the books, and the books eventually were pre-
scribed in 1252-1255. 
The reception of Aristotle 
The arrival of Aristotle’s texts in the West during the Middle Ages involves three 
stages. First, Boethius translated some works of logic and rhetoric in the sixth cen-
tury. Then in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, almost all the works of Aristotle 
were gradually translated, and they were systematically organized between the thir-
teenth and fourteenth centuries. A third stage, which mainly involved work on texts, 
began toward the end of the fifteenth century.23 The second stage, which is of impor-
tance here, took place within universities of developing cities. Masters of Arts real-
ized that they knew only the names of some entire areas of knowledge.24 A new inter-
est in studying these disciplines then emerged. The Aristotelian system of sciences 
was therefore an instrument toward recovering and organizing Aristotle’s works as 
well as translations from Arabic sources.25 The Nicomachean Ethics in particular was 
studied in the west before 1250 following two partial translations : the Ethica Noua 
and Vetus. The Ethica Vetus (dated near the end of the twelfth century) included 
books II and III. Around 1220 another incomplete translation appeared ; it was per-
haps made by Michael Scot.26 It was the Ethica Noua, which includes Book I and 
                                       
 22. CUP, t. I, no 201, p. 227-230 and no 246, p. 277-279. 
 23. Cf. C.H. LOHR, “The Medieval Interpretation of Aristotle”, in N. KRETZMANN, A. KENNY, J. PINBORG, 
ed., E. STUMP, associate ed., The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy : from the rediscovery 
of Aristotle to the disintegration of the scholasticism, 1100-1600, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1982, chap. 3, p. 81. 
 24. Cf. ibid., p. 82-83. 
 25. Cf. ibid., p. 86-87. 
 26. Cf. GAUTHIER, “Notes sur les débuts”, p. 332 : “Michel Scot […] accompagne l’archevêque de Tolède au 
IVe concile du Latran. Il n’est pas impossible (quoique la chose reste fort douteuse) que Michel Scot ait 
profité de ce séjour en Italie pour traduire du grec l’Éthique à Nicomaque : il serait l’auteur de la 
Translatio antiquior, […] dont le livre I connut une large diffusion sous le nom d’Ethica noua.” 
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therefore, the first definition of happiness (felicitas).27 These translations would be 
used until Robert Grosseteste made a complete translation in 1246-1248.28 
The arrival of Aristotle’s works to the West opened a wide range of possibilities 
for the masters of Arts. Thus, their interest in them made their field of knowledge be-
come wider and therefore overlapped with the theologians’ field, since only theologi-
ans were allowed to teach them. According to Claude Lafleur, “the consequence of 
the growth of their domain of studies made the masters of Arts realize the specificity 
and the value of their intellectual task : to study and to teach the whole human 
knowledge”.29 The theologians of Paris began using philosophy and reaching their 
own conclusions sometimes different from those of philosophers. The case of Ethics 
and the concept of happiness may be an example of this. Some authors consider that 
the seeds of the later conflict between the Faculties of Arts and Theology were sown 
when commentators on the Ethics started distinguishing between concepts that could 
be interpreted from what they called : “a theological point of view”, and those from 
“a philosophical point of view”.30 
III. PHILOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The reading of these texts includes several levels. A picture of these levels is im-
portant for understanding the reception of the Nicomachean Ethics in general, and the 
commentaries analyzed here in particular. The first level is that of the Nicomachean 
Ethics with which none of the authors here studied have worked. At the second level 
are situated the fragmentary Latin translations of the Nicomachean Ethics, which will 
be considered briefly. At the third level, finally, are the texts that will be discussed 
below. What is called “Aristotle” in the present paper is actually one of the “stan-
dard” interpretations of Aristotle. Today’s interpretations could involve a fourth level 
of analysis, but the presentation of the research will be simpler if “the present inter-
pretation of Aristotle” is considered as “Aristotle.” It should be recalled also that this 
interpretation is of the same epistemological value as the thirteenth-century interpre-
tations. 
                                       
 27. There are 40 extant codices of the Ethica Noua. They are listed in ARISTOTELES LATINUS, Ethica Nico-
machea, XXVI 1-3, fasciculus primus, Praefatio, by R.A. GAUTHIER, Leiden, Brill, 1973, p. LVIII-LXII. 
 28. AL, Ethica Nicomachea, fasciculus quartus. 
 29. Cf. C. LAFLEUR, “Les ‘guides de l’étudiant’ de la Faculté des arts de l’Université de Paris au XIIIe siècle”, 
in HOENEN, SCHNEIDER, WIELAND, ed., Philosophy and Learning : Universities in the Middle Ages, 
p. 139. (My translation.) 
 30. Cf. LOHR, “The Medieval Interpretation”, p. 87. Lohr gives Manuscript Ripoll 109 as an example. See also 
F. BERTELLONI, “Loquendo philosophice-loquendo theologice : Implicaciones ético-políticas en la Guía 
del Estudiante de Barcelona. A propósito de una reciente publicación de C. Lafleur”, Patristica et Mediae-
valia, 14 (1993), p. 21-40. This distinction has already been pointed out by some authors of the twelfth 
century such as Gilbert of Poitiers. N.M. HÄRING, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers, 
Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1996, p. 194, 78-85. However, one may say that there is 
a distinction between the philosopher and the theologian but their viewpoints are finally reconciled. In 
masters of Arts of the thirteenth century, as will be shown, the difference remains. Nevertheless, the dis-
tinction among these earlier authors can become an interesting topic of further research. 
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1. The source 
The masters comment on the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, i.e. the Ethica 
Noua, which deals with happiness in general.31 There, Aristotle defines political sci-
ence as a practical science. The political science is developed in the Nicomachean 
Ethics and in the Politics.32 In chapter 1 of the Ethics, Aristotle establishes the subject 
and method of this discipline. Ethics is a practical science ; it searches for the univer-
sal concerning our actions. Aristotle then defines the concept of happiness (eudaimo-
nia). There is a highest good which is the end that all things seek. Happiness is the 
end in the case of human actions. Happiness is not a means to achieve something 
else, because we all seek happiness for its own sake. It is a final end because what-
ever we seek is sought for the sake of achieving happiness. Happiness will reside in 
actions, in operations according to human virtue (aretè-excellence). We can reach 
this virtue through performance of good actions. Performing good actions will give us 
excellence ; therefore we will be happy, because whoever reaches excellence, and 
enjoys and sustains this state, also reaches happiness. Happiness then is an end and is 
moreover the highest good for which we wish. Happiness also involves self-suffi-
ciency. A virtuous man then will be self-sufficient (autarchès), and in this will reside 
his happiness. 
In which kind of life, then, does happiness dwell ?33 Aristotle builds a framework 
considering three kinds of life : the life of pleasures, the political life and the contem-
plative life. The fact that happiness cannot be encountered in the life of pleasure is 
clear, because it is related to corporeal life, and that is not what men specifically are. 
There are two remaining ways of life, political life and contemplative life.34 As man’s 
happiness is related to his nature (to what is proper to man), and what is proper to 
man (what defines him) is rationality, then his happiness is not related to pleasure or 
political life in the end,35 but rather to contemplative life. In addition, if happiness is 
                                       
 31. For a standard interpretation of Aristotle’s Ethics see ARISTOTE, L’Éthique à Nicomaque, introduction, 
traduction et commentaire par R.A. GAUTHIER et J.Y. JOLIF, Louvain, Publications Universitaires ; Paris, 
Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1970, t. I, 1 (1st ed. 1958). 
 32. The latter would not arrive to the West until around 1260-1265, when William of Moerbeke translated it. 
Before that, some excerpts of the Politica were known through other works and through florilegia. For a 
complete analysis on the date of translations and quotations see, C. FLÜELER, Rezeption und Interpretation 
der Aristotelischen Politica im späten Mittelalter, Amsterdam, Grüner, 1992, p. 15-29. For an account on 
the organization of philosophia practica before 1265, see F. BERTELLONI, “Les schèmes de la philosophia 
practica antérieurs à 1265 : leur vocabulaire concernant la Politique et leur rôle dans la réception de la Po-
litique d’Aristote”, in J. HAMESSE et C. STEEL, ed., L’Élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen 
Âge, Actes du colloque international de Louvain-la-Neuve et Leuven 12-14 septembre 1998 organisé par la 
Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Turnhout, Brepols (coll. “Rencontres de 
Philosophie Médiévale”, VIII), 2000, p. 171-202. 
 33. NE, 1095b13-19. 
 34. Even if Aristotle considers the political life very important it is mostly considered in the books of the Nico-
machean Ethics that had not yet arrived to the West or in the Politics, which was not available either. Nev-
ertheless, consideration is made of the felicitas ciuilis, for example, in the Commentary of Paris. 
 35. NE, 1095b19-1096a4. 
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an activity, it depends on man. One can be happy as a man.36 But happiness as well as 
virtue must last one’s whole life, for it to be a perfect life.37 
2. The translation used by the masters 
The authors, as noted earlier, worked with translations. Since the texts are based 
on a translation called Ethica Noua, some peculiarities of this translation should be 
noted. For example, the word “blessedness” (beatitudo translating makaria) appears 
three times in the Ethica Noua,38 seemingly reflecting the difference between it and 
happiness (felicitas translating eudaimonia). In addition, there is a gloss at the end of 
chapter 10 that suggests that men can be blessed like angels (“beatos homines ut an-
gelos”). The text should say “beatos autem ut homines”39 ; with the addition, “ut 
angelos”, it can be interpreted as meaning that there is something else that man can 
reach, such as “angelic blessedness.” The source of this gloss is perhaps in the Gos-
pels.40 This gloss could be also related to the fact that in these texts there is a close 
relationship between the powers of the separated soul and those of angels. It can be 
said because of this that separated souls can be similar to angels (at least in the fact 
that they are separated from matter).41 
                                       
 36. NE, 1101a14-21. 
 37. NE, I, 10, 1100a10-1101a21. Aristotle distinguishes between happiness (eudaimonia) and blessedness 
(makaria). Aristotle wonders if a man can only call himself happy at the end of his life. He answers this 
question with a distinction : “Happy” differs from “blessed” in that happiness depends only on the state of 
self-sufficiency (autarcheia) of the virtuous man, whereas blessedness comes from outside man, from for-
tune, and does not depend on man’s behaviour. “Blessed” is here more like “fortunate,” the one whose life 
has provided him with all desirable things. “Happy” is the man “sufficiently” virtuous to face unfortunate 
events while remaining happy (eudaimos), because “happiness” is within him in his virtuous actions and 
does not depend on external events. Therefore, one can say about a man that he is happy through his own 
efforts ; but one only can call “blessed” a man who has been given all things desirable for a man ; he is 
blessed in his whole life, but it does not depend on him. Aristotle says that he will focus here on the happy 
one, but our masters will not make that difference. In the discussion about how fortune might influence 
happiness, they do not distinguish sometimes between “happiness” and “blessedness,” and sometimes they 
would consider the importance of fortune for the concept of happiness when discussing perfect life. 
 38. AL, Ethica Nicomachea, fasciculus secundus ; Ethica Nova, 99b2, p. 82 ; 00b29, p. 87 ; 01b5, p. 89. 
 39. AL, Ethica Noua, p. 88, 01a14-21 : “Quid igitur prohibet felicem dicere eum qui secundum virtutem 
perfectam operatur et exterioribus sufficienter habundat, non quolibet tempore, set perfecta vita ? Aut ap-
ponendum et victurum ita et finiturum secundum racionem, quoniam futurum inmanifestum nobis, felici-
tatem autem finem et perfectum ponimus ubique et omnino. Si autem ita, beatos dicemus vivencium quibus 
existunt que dicta sunt, beatos autem homines [ut angelos].” 
 40. This gloss might have been inspired by some passages of the Gospels, such as Lk. 20.36 : “Neque enim 
ultra mori possunt : aequales enim angelis sunt et filii sunt Dei, cum sint filii resurrectionis.” And 
Mk. 12.25 : “Cum enim a mortuis resurrexerint, neque nubent neque nubentur, sed sunt sicut angeli in 
caelis.” And Mt. 22.30 : “[…] in resurrectione enim neque nubent neque nubentur, sed sunt sicut angeli in 
caelo.” Cf. Nova Vulgata. Bibliorum Sacrorum editio, sacrosancti oecumenici Concilii Vaticani II ratione 
habita iussu Pauli PP VI recognita Auctoritate Ioannis Pauli PP. II promulgata, Città del Vaticano, Libreria 
editrice Vaticana, 1998. 
 41. Cf. O. LOTTIN, “L’identité de l’âme et de ses facultés pendant la première moitié du XIIIe siècle”, Revue 
néoscolastique de philosophie, 36, 2e série, 41 (février 1934). Lottin talks about among others Philip the 
Chancellor who, as will be shown, had a strong influence on the Commentary of Paris. Also, cf. 
J. WEISHEIPL, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism. Avicebron : A Note on Thirteenth-Century 
Augustinianism”, The Southwestern journal of Philosophy, 10, 3 (april 1980), p. 239-260. 
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3. The interpretations 
Among the texts that are the subject of this paper, there are three different kinds 
of literature ; however, they all have the same subject. They all study the Ethica 
Noua, and interpreters have dated all of them before 1246-1248. The first is a com-
mentary with questions, the second is an examination-compendium and the third is an 
exposition. Two of these texts are written by anonymous masters of Arts of the Uni-
versity of Paris. The first has been called the Commentary of Paris, and the second, 
because of the city where the manuscript is situated, is usually called the Compen-
dium of Barcelona or Guide for students. Both texts have been edited ; the former 
partially edited by René A. Gauthier42 and the latter by Claude Lafleur.43 The third 
text, Expositio super libros Ethicorum, contained in two manuscripts,44 is the only 
one whose authorship is known (Robert Kilwardby). 
The Commentary of Paris is a commentary with questions. Gauthier has dated it 
between 1235 and 1240.45 Its method is the following : first a fragment of the source 
is cited literally, is commented on and a sentencia is fixed as the interpretation. Then, 
one or more questions are raised on this fragment and the commentator gives his so-
lution or sometimes leaves several alternative solutions. In addition, the author tends 
to discuss several topics not included in the Ethica Noua, but that can be derived 
from the discussion : for example, the structure of the soul. 
The Compendium of Barcelona is a guide for the students who want to pass the 
final examination of the Faculty of Arts of Paris. Lafleur has dated it between 1230 
and 1240. It is found in a single manuscript, since the production in series by the pe-
cia system was only available for works written by theologians.46 The author of the 
guide has a plan divided in three parts : Logic, Ethics and Natural Philosophy. The 
                                       
 42. R.A. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua d’un maître ès arts de Paris (1235-1240)”, Archives 
d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge, 42 (1975), p. 71-141. The remaining part of the work is 
the commentary on the Ethica Vetus contained in Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 3804a, ff. 152ra-159vb, continues in 
ff. 241ra-247vb ; and there is a third part in Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 3572, ff. 226ra-235vb. About the rela-
tionship between these two manuscripts, see J. SCLAFER, “Remarques concernant quelques manuscrits uni-
versitaires de l’abbaye St-Martial de Limoges copiés par Jean le Limousin”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale 
et littéraire du Moyen Âge, 42 (1975), p. 143-146. 
 43. C. LAFLEUR, avec la collaboration de J. CARRIER, Le “Guide de l’étudiant” d’un maître anonyme de la 
Faculté des Arts de Paris au XIIIe siècle. Édition critique provisoire du ms. Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona 
d’Aragó, Ripoll 109, fol. 134ra-158va, Québec, Faculté de philosophie (coll. « Publications du Laboratoire 
de philosophie ancienne et médiévale de la Faculté de philosophie de l’Université Laval », I), 1992. 
 44. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, ff. 285r-307v, and Prague, Czech State Library 513 III. F. 10, ff. 1-11 (this 
second manuscript contains only the commentary on Book I). The Cambridge manuscript is the only one 
used for this analysis. 
 45. Cf. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 71. This commentary is part of a longer commentary that 
includes the Ethica Vetus that is described by O. LOTTIN, “Un commentaire sur l’Ethica Vetus des environs 
de 1230-1240”, Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, 6 (1934), p. 84-88, and is also studied by 
O. LOTTIN in “Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des arts de Paris, aux approches de 1250”, Revue néos-
colastique de philosophie, 42, 2e série, 62 (mai 1939), p. 182-212. 
 46. Cf. L.J. BATAILLON, “Les textes théologiques et philosophiques diffusés à Paris par exemplar et pecia”, in 
La production du livre universitaire au Moyen Âge : exemplar et pecia, Actes du symposium tenu au Col-
legio San Bonaventura de Grottaferrata en mai 1983, textes réunis par L.J. BATAILLON, B.G. GUYOT, 
R.H. ROUSE, Paris, Éditions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1988, p. 159. 
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part devoted to Ethics is divided in three : first the questions devoted to the subject 
and division of moral philosophy ; second the questions devoted to the Ethics ; and 
finally some questions on Plato’s Timaeus and on Boethius’ De Consolatione Phi-
losophiae.47 The part on the Ethica Noua and Vetus is developed according to several 
questions established for the examinations. In addition, there is a pronounced interest 
on methodological issues within Ethics. 
The Expositio super libros Ethicorum of Robert Kilwardby has been dated by 
P.O. Lewry between 1240 and 1245.48 Lewry also argues for the authorship of Kil-
wardby, based on style and contents. Kilwardby quotes excerpts from the source, ex-
plaining the sense and clarifying some terms. This way of commenting was very 
common and was also used by Albert the Great. 
New literary genres that discuss philosophical subjects were organized according 
to methodological needs. In addition, these new ways of writing entailed the need to 
explain the new philosophy. The philosophical issues that spring from these texts are 
many. Some of them such as the concept of happiness are of interest here, because 
the interpretations would be different according to theologians and according to phi-
losophers. 
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 
Since the Faculty of Arts was very strong in its teaching of logic, it is not sur-
prising that all these authors are very interested in method.49 Method was then their 
first concern, because the strictness of the sciences depends on the correctness of the 
reasoning. They spent considerable time analyzing how Aristotle organizes this new 
discipline. The Guide devotes five paragraphs defining and dividing moral science.50 
After that, it describes the division of the books in five further paragraphs.51 Only 
then does it start to consider the subject of this science, which is its proper subject, 
and how should one approach it.52 The authors were concerned about whether Ethics 
is a science.53 As a practical discipline, it must be considered in a different way from 
the speculative sciences. The Guide for students considers that science must proceed 
in a demonstrative, universal way ; and if Ethics talks about operationes, which are 
                                       
 47. Cf. LAFLEUR, “Les ‘guides de l’étudiant’ de la Faculté des arts”, p. 179. In Lafleur’s description, of 99 col-
umns in the entire manuscript, 60 are devoted to logic, 24 to grammar and only 5 to ethics. Cf. ibid., 
p. 147. 
 48. Cf. P.O. LEWRY, “Robert Kilwardby’s commentary on the Ethica Noua and Vetus”, in C. WENIN, ed., 
L’homme et son univers au Moyen Âge, Actes du septième congrès international de philosophie médiévale, 
Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut supérieur de philosophie (coll. “Philosophes médiévaux”, XXVII), 1986, 
p. 799-807. 
 49. Here the studies of logical problems are not considered, even if they were of major concern in the Faculty 
of Arts, since only the discoveries or the inferences made through the study of Ethics are of interest here. 
Nevertheless, some methodological issues can be found also in texts devoted to the Ethics. 
 50. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 73-77. 
 51. Ibid., § 78-82. 
 52. Ibid., § 83-91. 
 53. Ibid., § 85. 
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singular, it is an art rather than a science.54 Also Kilwardby considers arguments and 
reasons in detail when he reports on Aristotle. He establishes how many arguments 
are stated for each thesis, and he analyzes each argument in itself, considering some-
times even each part of a syllogism when an argument is more complicated.55 
A very important aspect related to methodology is the way the masters present 
the answers to a question. They use the formulas secundum philosophos/secundum 
theologos and loquendo theologice/loquendo philosophice, to distinguish the points 
of view from which they consider a question, and many times they leave questions 
unsolved.56 According to Lottin, the practice of differentiation, already spread 
by 1230-1240, tended to be characteristic of the masters of Arts.57 Even if one finds 
the same formulas in texts of theologians of the same period, such as John of La Ro-
chelle, these theologians do not posit the formulas as the two answers of an unsolved 
question.58 In the texts of the masters of Arts, sometimes the theologians’ answer is 
discussed and refuted in the philosophers’ answer, but the masters do not solve the 
questions when the solution comes from philosophers. In other words, the masters do 
not explicitly claim their agreement with philosophers’ solutions. Rather, they leave 
the question with two alternative answers. They are alternative answers because they 
do not add any weight (perhaps only because it was obvious) to the answer of theolo-
gians. The two alternative answers are then equal from a methodological (logical) 
point of view. In addition, as will be proved below, the answers are sometimes op-
posed, and masters identify themselves with philosophers.59 
1. Concept of happiness as highest good 
In the Commentary of Paris happiness is an end which is the highest good that 
“everything seeks” (Omnia appetunt summum bonum).60 This highest good, i.e. 
happiness, is also identified with the First (Primum) or the First Cause (Prima 
Causa).61 This identification may lead to the reification of happiness : although 
according to Aristotle happiness consists in living well and acting well (that is pro-
duced and maintained by virtuous actions), if happiness is identified with something 
like the First or the First Cause, the concept of happiness as an operation would be 
changed. One may indeed finish by identifying happiness with God. According to the 
commentator of Paris, there are traces or images of the highest good in the world, but 
                                       
 54. Ibid., § 86. 
 55. Cf. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 289va. 
 56. See below in this paper. 
 57. Cf. O. LOTTIN, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, Louvain, Gembloux, 1957, t. I, p. 523, 525. 
 58. JEAN DE LA ROCHELLE, Tractatus de divisione multiplici potentiarum animae, edited by P. MICHAUD-
QUANTIN, Paris, Vrin (coll. “Textes philosophiques du Moyen Âge”, XI), 1964 ; especially the tertia pars 
devoted to happiness, p. 137-190. 
 59. See below, section IV, 3, “Happiness in Life”, p. 470-475. 
 60. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 96 : “quia omnes philosophi comunicabant in hoc quod omnia 
appetunt summum bonum, et nominabant illud nomine felicitatis…” (Ethica Noua, p. 65, 1094a2-3). 
 61. Cf. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 106 (see the two following notes). 
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the highest good itself cannot be found on earth.62 These traces or images come from 
a spiritual light that is the highest good itself, i.e. the First.63 Here, the highest good 
receives other specificity, this time with the light of the First, whose traces or images 
are in all things. He is talking in this passage about Augustine, whose theory of illu-
mination will be used later to analyze the knowledge implied for an earthly happi-
ness. Finally, the First is identified with God.64 
In relation to this, the Commentary of Paris introduces the discussion of God’s 
attributes along with the concept of the highest good. The first question is, in what 
manner is everything that exists good just because it exists.65 The commentator ar-
gues that things are good because they exist because of the will of the First. What 
God wants is good. Then everything would be wise, because of his wisdom, and 
powerful because of his power.66 Therefore, he answers that first is power, then wis-
dom, and finally goodness. Whatever exists is one, is true, and is good. The unity of 
everything comes from the power of the First ; the truth comes from the wisdom of 
the First ; and the wisdom in the First is related to forms that are like examples of 
things. With respect to these examples things are true ; so the truth of things comes 
from the wisdom of the First.67 Finally, the goodness of things comes from the will of 
the First. Therefore, everything is good just because it exists ; and the one precedes 
the true ; and the true precedes the good, but not absolutely,68 because in that case 
                                       
 62. Ibid. : “Ad hoc dicendum quod omnes habent summum bonum, set non habent summum bonum sicut 
beatificans, set alio modo ; quia in omnibus est primum, quia in quibusdam est sufficiencia sicut in diuiciis, 
et non est ibi sufficiencia que est in ipso, set uestigium aud imago. Et sic patet quod omnia et homines om-
nes possunt appetere summum bonum.” 
 63. Ibid. : “Aliter dicendum est, sicut dicit Augustinus supra Johannem in illo uerbo : ‘Erat lux in tenebris et 
tenebre eam non comprehenderunt’, et dicit ibi quod lux solis equaliter se habet ad cecos et uidentes, set 
tamen ceci non recipiunt lumen solis, set uidentes ; similiter lux spiritualis, hoc est summum bonum, equa-
liter est in omnibus tam bonis quam malis, tamen mali non recipiunt lumen a primo ; et sic summum bo-
num est in ipsis et tamen non habent ipsum, et sic appetunt ipsum. Et hoc modo debet intelligi quod dicit.” 
See also subsequent question, p. 106-107. 
 64. Ibid., p. 121-122. See, infra, n. 66. 
 65. Ibid., p. 121 : “Primo dubitatur in hunc modum. Quecunque sunt, in quantum sunt, bona sunt ; quare omnia 
in quantum sunt, bona sunt.” (Cf. BOETHIUS, De hebdomadibus, PL, 64, 1311D). 
 66. Ibid., p. 121-122 : “Ad hoc dicendum est quod non dicuntur omnia bona quia sunt ab uno bono, set dicun-
tur esse bona quia sunt a uoluntate primi. Quia enim Deus uoluit, ideo omnia sunt bona. Set sic est quod 
uoluntas semper est respectu boni, et quia uoluntas est boni in quantum bonum, quecunque sunt a uoluntate 
primi sunt bona. Vnde dicendum est quod non debuisset facere hoc argumentum : quia sunt a bonitate 
primi omnia sunt bona, ergo omnia sapiencia ab ipsius sapiencia ; set debuisset facere hoc argumentum : 
quia sunt a uoluntate primi, sunt uoluntaria, ergo a sapiencia sapiencia et a potencia potencia. Et propter 
hoc dicendum est aliter quod sine dubio omnia bona sunt a uoluntate primi, et quia uoluntas semper est 
boni in quantum bonum, omnia quecunque sunt a uoluntate, bona sunt.” 
 67. According to Georg Wieland, the use of the transcendentia (ens, unum, bonum, uerum) comes from Philip 
the Chancellor. Cf. G. WIELAND, “L’émergence de l’éthique philosophique au XIIIe siècle, avec une atten-
tion spéciale pour le ‘Guide de l’étudiant parisien’”, in LAFLEUR et CARRIER, ed., L’enseignement de la 
philosophie, p. 169-170. Cf. PHILIPPI CANCELLARII PARISIENSIS Summa de Bono, ad fidem codicum pri-
mum edita studio et cura N. WICKI, Bernae, Editiones Francke (coll. “Corpus philosophorum medii aeui, 
Opera philosophica mediae aetatis selecta”, II), 1985, q. 1-3, p. 5-23. 
 68. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 122 : “Vnde prius est potencia et postea sapiencia et postea 
bonitas ; quecunque enim sunt, unum sunt ; et quecunque sunt, uera sunt ; et quecunque sunt, bona sunt ; et 
unitas omnium est a potencia primi, unius enim proprie est potencia ; ueritas omnium est a sapiencia primi, 
sapiencia enim est in ipso quantum ad formas que sunt in ipso in ratione exemplarium quorum est cognitio  
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there would be composition, which would be a violation of God’s simplicity.69 This 
text is a good example to illustrate Lafleur’s opinion that masters felt they were 
meant to investigate the whole domain of knowledge. The master researches in a 
theological70 field and his remarks are not at all superficial. 
Something different can be found in the Guide for students. As the master identi-
fies happiness with the First, he concludes that it is uncaused.71 In that case it could 
not be participable to humans because “the first is not participable in its essence”. He 
then concludes that Aristotle talks here about a caused happiness.72 This kind of 
classification is analyzed and deeply developed all through the thirteenth century. 
There will be different kinds of classification : felicitas creata/increata, or cau-
sata/incausata, or perfecta/imperfecta.73 The reason for this proliferation of felicitates 
might be in the identification of happiness with God. To achieve that kind of happi-
ness seems not possible here below (apud nos). If the masters themselves want to 
build a human science, then they have to establish a happiness that is possible here 
below. Nevertheless, the commentator of Paris considers that according to philoso-
phers even the happiness as he has stated is possible to achieve in this life.74 
The Guide for students goes on to consider that happiness is a certain act or per-
fection of the soul.75 Then, it regards happiness as something to be acquired through 
virtue.76 Moreover, at the end of the same paragraph it defines intellectual virtues as 
“performed through the admiration of the forms that come from the First and of the 
                                       
et cognitio est respectu ipsius ueri et sic ueritas rerum siue encium est a sapiencia primi ; bonitas autem en-
cium est a uoluntate primi, et quia uoluntas est respectu boni, encia dicuntur bona. Et sic patet quare omnia 
in quantum sunt, bona sunt. Et notandum quod unum precedit uerum et uerum bonum et est ibi ordo aliquo 
modo, etsi non sit prius et posterius simpliciter.” 
 69. The fact that “everything is good because it exists” is evidence of the readings on Boethius De Hebdomadi-
bus (PL, 64, p. 1311a-1313c). 
 70. The consideration of Potentia, Sapiencia et Bonitas comes from Hugues of Saint Victor and Richard of 
Saint Victor that influenced Peter Lombard (Sententiae L I, d. 34, c. 3-4). Gauthier himself considers this 
(p. 121). These three concepts are closely related to the Trinity, as it is evident in the text of Peter 
Lombard, so the master refers clearly to the revealed Theology and not to a “mere” theology of the phi-
losophers. This last distinction is actually advanced some years after the texts analyzed here by Thomas 
Aquinas, in the Expositio super Boetium De Trinitate, q. 5 (ed. B. DECKER). Even if there is a vivid discus-
sion on the division of speculative science in Thomas as well as in Aristotle, this paper does not intend to 
be included in this discussion. 
 71. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 92 : “Item queritur utrum felicitas de qua hic agitur sit causata. Et 
uidetur quod non. Probat enim hic auctor quod illa est bonum perfectissimum. Sed nichil est tale nisi Pri-
mum. Ergo hec felicitas est ut Primum ; ergo est incausata. — Ad hoc dicimus quod felicitas dicitur esse 
bonum perfectissimum inter bona participabilia uel humana. Et sic intelligi hic Aristotiles. Primum autem 
non est participabile in sui essentia, cum sit simplicissimum. Propter hoc illud quod dicitur hic, intelligitur 
de felicitate causata.” 
 72. Ibid. 
 73. For an inquiry about these different kinds of happiness see A.J. CELANO, “The ‘Finis hominis’ in the thir-
teenth-century commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics”, Archives d´histoire doctrinale et lit-
téraire du Moyen Âge, 53 (1986), p. 23-53. 
 74. See below, section IV, 3, “Happiness in Life”, p. 470-475. 
 75. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 77 : “Est autem felicitas causata et est quidam actus anime uel 
perfectio, ut habetur in primo Ethicorum.” NE I, 13, 1102a5-6, Ethica Noua, p. 91. 
 76. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 79 : “quia uirtus est medium per quod acquiritur huiusmodi felicitas.” 
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contemplation of It”.77 Here intellectual virtues are like happiness, both are related to 
the knowledge and contemplation of the First. In the value that they grant to the in-
tellectual virtues, the text is reminiscent of the tenth book of Nicomachean Ethics. 
The stress is on the knowledge of the First or of the First Cause. Moreover, the 
Guide for students states that happiness “is a caused good through which the soul can 
have enjoyment in the home of the First Cause”.78 At the same time, “there is another 
life in which the soul lives in itself knowing and feeling the First, and in such life 
there is happiness”.79 Out of all this a coherent concept may be outlined ; happiness is 
given with the performance of intellectual virtues that belong to the soul alone. Be-
cause of this, the soul is happy in this life through the contemplation of forms in the 
First, but it is better that the soul be separated from the body. In general, the fact of 
knowing and enjoying the First can be considered as a contemplative life, a contem-
plative life of the separated soul. However, as will be discussed below, there is the 
possibility of contemplation on earth. 
The identification that two of our masters make of happiness with the First shows 
their effort to build a coherent system (with or without Aristotle’s system). In any 
event, this identification with the First probably makes happiness something more 
difficult to achieve in this life, although in the same respect not impossible, as will be 
noted by the masters.80 
According to Kilwardby, happiness is as in the Ethica Noua the act of the virtu-
ous soul during a complete life.81 Master Kilwardby also explains that happiness con-
sists in living well and acting well, bene vivere is the first act of the soul and bene op-
erare is the second act of the soul.82 This teaching comes from the De Anima which 
was by then very popular.83 Then he considers which acts are proper to man, i.e. the 
                                       
 77. Ibid., § 79 : “Et notandum quod uirtus intellectualis est per admirationem formarum a Primo et Eius 
contemplationem.” 
 78. Ibid., § 77 : “Huiusmodi autem sciencie uirtus dicitur esse subiectum a quibusdam, quia principaliter est 
intentio de uirtute – sicut dicunt –, per quam felicitas acquiritur. Potest tamen felicitas melius subiectum 
dici eo quod est finis propter quem omnes operationes fiunt et uirtutes. In moribus enim finis principaliter 
mouet et propter finem omnia intenduntur. Est autem felicitas causata et est quidam actus anime uel per-
fectio, ut habetur in primo Ethicorum, deducens ipsam in Esse Optimum (est enim felicitas bonum perfec-
tissimum inter bona participabilia ; est enim primum bonum quod participari non potest per essentiam 
suam). Est illud bonum causatum mediante quo potest anima frui loco Prime Cause.” 
 79. Ibid., § 95 : “est autem alia uita qua uiuit anima in se intelligendo et affectando Primum, et in tali est felici-
tas.” 
 80. See below, section IV, 3, “Happiness in Life”, p. 470-475. 
 81. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 291va : “ergo quod cum in precedenti parte narraverit Aristoteles felicitatem 
esse aliqua operacionem anime studiose practice in uita perfecta iam in subsequenti parte idem demonstra-
tionis. Sub alio tamen modo declarauit enim quod circa operaciones sit ipsius anime optimas et delectabi-
lissimas et talis etiam operacio practica studiosa durans in uita perfecta.” (NE 1101a10-19). 
 82. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 287ra : “alia est ex parte rei scilicet quod existimant bene uiuere et bene 
operari esse idem felicitati et intelligit per uiuere actum anime primum, per operari actum anime secun-
dum.” The Commentator of Paris makes a similar consideration see GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica 
Noua”, p. 114. 
 83. This has been shown by GAUTHIER, “Le traité ‘De Anima et de potenciis eius’.” In a recent publication 
B. BAZÁN, Anonymi Magistri Artium “Sententia super II et III ‘De anima’” (Ms. Oxford, Bodleian Li-
brary, Lat. Misc. c. 70, fol. 1ra-25vb ; Roma, Bibl. Naz. V. E. 828, fol. 46vb, 48ra-52ra). Édition, étude 
critique et doctrinale par B.C. BAZÁN. Texte du De anima uetus par K. WHITE, Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut  
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operations that men do, because they are men, not because they are physicians or ar-
chitects.84 The act proper to man is the act of the soul as a rational soul. Virtue is per-
formed as an act or operation of the rational soul. Then happiness consists of the op-
eration of the zealous soul during the whole life. In any case, Kilwardby considers 
that happiness within the purview of practical science is not related or compared with 
a gift of God. He does not include God in his analysis. The question whether happi-
ness is given by God does not pertain to political science but rather to metaphysics or 
to theology.85 Considering the boundaries between sciences allows Kilwardby to fol-
low the text of Aristotle even if he has to oppose other opinions. 
Apart from Kilwardby, the other masters add several components to the concept 
of happiness. The most important perhaps is the identification of happiness with the 
First. This identification permits the building of a different link between ethics and 
natural philosophy and also between ethics and metaphysics. In this way the masters 
are impelled to study metaphysics and natural philosophy to explain, first, the nature 
of the First, and then the structure of the soul that makes possible the knowledge of 
the First. Also, because the goal is getting far from man’s possibilities, a problem 
arises related to man’s sufficiency to achieve happiness through virtue. 
2. The place of virtue in the concept of happiness 
As the subject of a practical science, happiness is considered an operation. The 
masters read in Aristotle and agree that happiness consists in living well and operat-
ing well (bene vivere et bene operare). However, the identification of the highest 
good with the First creates a number of interpretations. The commentator of Paris 
considers happiness as an operation, but in the following sense : the soul united with 
the First knows it and loves it. If happiness is an operation, this operation consists in 
loving and knowing the First.86 The commentator considers happiness more a union 
with the First than an action, because only in the union with the First (which is hap-
piness itself) is there happiness. Happiness is the operation of knowing and loving the 
First, which the commentator identifies with God. In any case, to consider happiness 
                                       
supérieur de philosophie ; Louvain et Paris, Peeters (coll. “Philosophes médiévaux”, XXXVII), 1998, has 
affirmed that there was actually courses on De Anima, as the one that he publishes. 
 84. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 290ra : “in prima ostendit quod aliqua est operacio hominis secundum quod 
homo. […] Communiter intendit que est hec operacio : ostendens que sit operacio secundum animam ra-
cionalem in quantum talis sic operacio hominis et quod homo est secundum animam eius set non est 
secundum uegetatiuam et sensitiuam, ergo secundum racionalem et utique in hac racione hoc nomine uita 
pro anima. Ex hoc enim quod proprius actus anime est uiuificare se et per anima ponitur uita.” 
 85. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 291vb : “dicit quod cum quicquid inest hominibus insit a doctrina, racionale 
est felictitatem a deo datam esse, cum deus sit causarum optima, et felicitas sit bonorum humanorum opti-
mum ; set utrum sic sit uel non, alterius scrutacionis est quam ciuilis, sicut forte methaphisice uel theolo-
gice.” He makes this assertion concerning what Aristotle claims in 1099b11-14. Aristotle here says that 
happiness as a gift of God is a scrutiny of another science ; however he does not precise in which science it 
is to be investigated. See Ethica Noua, ed. GAUTHIER, p. 83, 6-7 : “Set hoc quidem utique alterius erit 
scrutacionis proprium.” 
 86. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 107 : “Iterum, felices operantur, scilicet in aspiciendo primum 
et cognoscendo ; vnde cognoscere primum et diligere sunt opera alicuius cum habet felicitatem. Et hoc 
modo intelligit auctor cum dicit quod ipsi dicebant quod uita et operatio sunt idem felicitati.” 
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as the act of knowing the First is remarkable since, without having the tenth book of 
the Ethics, the masters were already considering that the highest good involves the 
knowledge of the highest things. 
However, if happiness consists in knowing and loving the First, achieving happi-
ness becomes more complicated. Achieving happiness through the performance of 
virtues is not so easy to link with this concept. The commentator of Paris considers 
that the exercise of virtue remains only a means to approach happiness, not to achieve 
happiness. (“quia uirtus secundum quam attenditur uita contemplatiua est medium 
quo nobis unitur felicitas”)87 Happiness is united to us, not vice versa. Virtue then is 
reduced to a means through which one does not achieve but only merits happiness. 
Thus, virtue is a necessary condition but not sufficient to achieve happiness. The de-
cisive movement is only performed by the highest good itself.88 When the union 
(coniunctio) happens, then an operation (operatio) occurs watching and knowing the 
First (“in aspiciendo et cognoscendo Primum”) according to the commentator of 
Paris. 
Indeed, if virtue is not enough to achieve happiness, men are not sufficient or 
competent (sufficiens) to achieve happiness. The problem of sufficiency in achieving 
happiness is not trivial, because according to the Paris commentator only a perfect 
life will be sufficient to achieve happiness. He analyzes the various kinds of life ac-
cording to the classification of Aristotle in two ways. In one way he links each kind 
of life according to each kind of soul, and in another way he considers each kind of 
life as a face of the soul ; it looks above it, below it and to its equals.89 The latter 
analysis can be considered an allusion to the theory of the two faces of the soul.90 
                                       
 87. Ibid., p. 115. 
 88. Cf. ibid., p. 107 : “tamen errabant in hoc quod dicebant quod nos sumus principium sufficiens uniendi illud 
summum bonum nobis.” 
 89. Ibid., p. 115 : “Item queritur de enumeratione istius triplicis uite et penes que accipiuntur ? Ad hoc duplex 
solutio. Et est prima hec. Vita uoluptuosa sumitur secundum animam uegetabilem, quia uita uoluptuosa est 
in corpore per comparationem ad potenciam generatiuam et nutritiuam. Vita ciuilis sumitur penes animam 
sencibilem, quia uana gloria et honor et huiusmodi sunt in anima sencibili, aud si sunt in rationali, hoc est 
in comparatione ad animam sencibilem ; item, illi ciues qui faciunt quecunque faciunt propter honores et 
uanam gloriam, uiuunt sicut bestie, et ideo sumitur uita ciuilis penes animam sencibilem. Vita autem 
contemplatiua sumitur penes animam intellectiuam ; in anima enim intellectiua sunt uirtus et sciencia circa 
que consistit uita contemplatiua ; […] Aliter dicendum est quod iste sumuntur penes animam intellectiuam. 
Set notandum quod anima intellectiua siue humana habet triplicem comparationem : comparatur enim ad 
corpus quod sub ipsa est, et comparatur ad ea que supra ipsam sunt, et comparatur ad ea que in equali se 
habent cum ipsa. Et uita uoluptuosa attenditur <in comparatione> anime humane ad corpus quod sub ipsa 
est ; uita enim uoluptuosa, sicut iam dictum est, est circa corpus in illa parte in qua uirtus generatiua et nu-
tritiua. Vita autem ciuilis attenditur in comparatione unius anime humane ad aliam, uel unius hominis ad 
alium hominem ; uita enim ciuilis est qua unus homo uiuit honeste cum aliis hominibus ; et sic patet quod 
uita ciuilis sumitur in comparatione anime humane ad equalia sibi. Vita autem contemplatiua sumitur in 
comparatione anime humane ad superiora siue ad felicitatem, quia uirtus secundum quam attenditur uita 
contemplatiua est medium quo nobis unitur felicitas.” 
 90. LOTTIN, “Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des arts de Paris”, p. 190 (ms. 3804a, f. 152va) : “Aliter dicen-
dum est quod, sicut anima secundum partem speculatiuam habet duplicem naturam secundum quam com-
paratur ad superiora et hec uocatur intellectus agens, aliam habet secundum quam comparatur ad inferiora 
et hec uocatur intellectus possibilis, et secundum intellectum agentem semper est in anima ueritas, secun-
dum possibilem non, similiter ex parte intellectus practici sunt iste diuerse nature : una que respondet in-
tellectui agenti et hec uocatur superior semper est ad bonum, inferior non ; et ad hanc ultimam partem per- 
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Although humans are not sufficient (sufficiens) to achieve happiness in any of 
these lives, there are two opinions on whether humans are sufficient to do the good, 
i.e. to perform virtue. First, the opinion of theologians as well as the master’s is that 
we (humans) are a complete principle of the bad but not a complete principle of the 
good.91 Following this, the author gives two accounts of the source of good actions. 
On one hand, the philosophers’ opinion is that we are the principle of virtue, which is 
good92 ; we are then sufficient or competent to do the good, because we produce the 
good habit of virtue out of good behaviour. On the other hand, according to theologi-
ans, God infuses virtue in us93 ; the condition of possibility of our good behaviour 
comes from outside and because of that we would not be sufficient to do good. In this 
part, the answers are clearly opposite, because the habitus of virtue is infused by 
God’s illumination according to theologians, and the same habitus is the result of 
several operations according to philosophers.94 One must say also that in this part the 
                                       
ficiendam et rectificandam indigemus scientia morali.” About the two faces of the soul see J. ROHMER, 
“Sur la doctrine franciscaine des deux faces de l’âme”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du 
Moyen Âge, 2 (1927), p. 73-77. He relates this doctrine to Jean de la Rochelle and to Gundissalinus. This 
theory can be also found in ARNVLFI PROVINCIALIS, MAGISTRI ARTIVM PARISIENSIS (c. 1250), Divisio 
scientiarum, in LAFLEUR, Quatre introductions, p. 335-336, l. 540-560. There is in this text also a peculiar 
theory of the rise of the soul to the Creator through intellectual virtues, which is studied by 
R.A. GAUTHIER, “Arnoul de Provence et la doctrine de la fronesis vertu mystique suprême”, Revue du 
Moyen Âge Latin, 19 (1963), p. 129-170. 
 91. LOTTIN, “Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des arts de Paris”, p. 198 quoting the Commentary of Paris on 
the Ethica Vetus : “Dicendum quod nos sumus omnino principium mali ; sed nos non sumus omnino prin-
cipium boni ; immo, sicut dictum est prius, bonitas datur nobis a primo qui illuminat intellectum nostrum, 
et postea facimus bonum ; et hoc modo intelligunt theologi dicentes <quod> quia boni sumus, ideo bonum 
facimus, intelligentes de bonitate ista ; quia autem operatio bona, cuius fundamentum est ratio recta data a 
prima intelligencia, facit habitum qui est uirtus consuetudinalis, ideo dicimus quod operatio bona facit ha-
bitum bonum ; sed nos omnino sumus principium <mali> et apud nos et apud theologos, et ideo malum 
non diversificatur sicut bonum.” Nevertheless, he adds the philosophical point of view about this issue and 
he considers that in this case he and the theologians agree. 
 92. LOTTIN, “Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des arts de Paris”, p. 199 : “Aliter potest dici et ista solutio est 
secundum philosophos et non secundum theologos ; et tunc dicendum est quod nos sumus principium uir-
tutis tantum ; unde uoluntas que est in nobis existens et determinata est causa operationis ; que operatio 
causat uirtutem ; et secundum istum modum dicendum est quod operationes de necessitate antecedunt et 
nullus habitus antecedit operationes in moralibus ; et hoc modo dicendo, dicendum est quod illud quod di-
citur quod omnis causa nobilior est causato, intelligendum est de causa determinata et non de causa inde-
terminata ; uoluntas enim est causa indeterminata et non causa determinata ; et propter hoc, cum operatio-
nes que causant uirtutem sint a uoluntate que est causa indeterminata, non oportet quod sint digniores et 
perfectiores habitu qui est uirtus.” 
 93. Ibid. : “Dicendum est quod loquendo theologice oportet dicere quod habitus bonus de necessitate precedit 
omnem operationem bonam, quia ratio recta est data a prima intelligentia ut illuminet intellectum huma-
num ; que quidem ratio recta est fundamentum cuiuslibet operationis bone ; et hoc est quod dicunt theologi 
quod bonum est infusum a Deo quo dirigente bene operamur. Et sic non sumus solum principium boni ; et 
hoc modo intelligendo dicendum est quod habitus est ante omnem operationem bonam, et secundum hoc 
concedimus omnia argumenta, que sunt ad hoc ostendendum ; unde non est inconveniens quod operationes 
causantes habitum qui est derelictus in intellectu a prima intelligentia illuminante ipsum practicum intel-
lectum.” 
 94. GAUTHIER considers that the commentator never opposes but only distinguishes the two opinions, see “Le 
cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 79 : “s’il n’oppose jamais théologie et philosophie, il s’est montré plus d’une 
fois soucieux de les distinguer.” He considers also the Commentary on the Ethica Vetus that he quotes from 
the same source as here. However, if the commentator says just the opposite thing according to theologians 
from that according to philosophers, he is opposing and not only distinguishing them. The fact that he does 
not say “they are opposite” is not making it “less” opposite. 
PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS ON HAPPINESS 
467 
key is found to affirm that the author identifies himself as a philosopher. The reason 
for this is that he is always using this double opinion : when the opinions agree he 
says “among us and among theologians”,95 and when the opinions disagree he talks 
about “philosophers” and “theologians” (he replaces “us” by “philosophers”, perhaps 
in order not to get involved in the discussion). 
Kilwardby considers two important elements on the matter of virtue and habitus ; 
first, that there must be pleasure in a virtuous action, and second that the action itself 
is more important than habitus. The reason is that repeated action (ab assuetudine) 
makes habitus and habitus does not exist without having action before.96 In addition, 
Kilwardby will consider sufficiency as a property of happiness.97 If men can be happy 
(and they can, according to Kilwardby), then they will be sufficient to achieve happi-
ness in this life, because they can perform virtue by habit (ab assuetudine).98 
In the Guide for students, men’s sufficiency to do good and bad is also discussed. 
There, the difference between the human science of philosophers and the discipline of 
theologians is also stressed. The question asked is whether we are the entire cause of 
good and the entire cause of bad. There are two answers : from a philosophical point 
of view, we are the entire cause of good and bad ; but from a theological point of 
view we are not a sufficient cause of good, it is necessary that God infuse his grace in 
us ; this is called “sinderesis” by theologians.99 The answer according to theologians 
agrees with the answer of the Commentary of Paris according to theologians. How-
ever the answer according to theologians is more developed in the Commentary of 
Paris as observed earlier. 
Since happiness consists in love and knowledge of the First there are only two 
substances that can do that : men and angels according to the author of the Guide for 
students.100 There was a discussion among the masters of Arts as well as theologians 
                                       
 95. See, supra, n. 91 : “Apud nos et apud theologos.” 
 96. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 295va-b. 
 97. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 289vb, l. 14-22 : “primo dicit quod eadem conclusio ostendendi potest ex 
autharchia (scr. cum fonte] eucharistia cod.) id est ex parte sufficiencia felicitatis et dicitur ab eu quod est 
bonum et archos quod est princeps siue custos sufficiente et hoc est : uidetur autem. Primo ponit racionem 
suam talem bonum per se sufficiens est perfectum et propter se tantum eligibile. Set bonum quod facit ef-
fectum eligibilem et nullo modo indigentem est per se sufficiens ergo huiusmodi bonum est perfectum et 
propter se tantum eligibile. Set felicitas est huiusmodi bonum ergo felicitas est bonum perfectum et propter 
se tantum eligibile”. In the Ethica Noua, p. 75-76, 97b6-7 one reads : “Videtur autem et ex autharchia <id 
est per se sufficiencia> idem contingere ; perfectum enim bonum per se sufficiens esse videtur. Per se suf-
ficiens enim dicimus non se solo vivente vitam solitarem, set et parentibus et filiis et uxore et universis 
amicis et civibus, quoniam natura civilis homo.” (My emphasis.) 
 98. See, infra, n. 118. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 295va : “virtus tum non perficit in nobis a natura set ab 
assuetudine.” 
 99. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 119 : “<Queritur> utrum nos sumus tota causa boni sicut sumus tota 
causa mali. Et uidetur quod sic per iam dicta, quia uoluntas est in nobis ut principium utriusque. — Ad 
quod dicimus quod loquendo philosophice sumus tota causa utriusque. Loquendo tamen theologice non 
sumus sufficientes ad bonum, sed oportet gratiam in nobis a Deo infundi, que a theologis sinderesis appel-
lantur.” About synderesis see also § 106. Cf. PHILIPPUS CANCELLARIUS, Summa de bono, ed. WICKI, 
p. 192. 
100. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 93 : “Ad hoc dicendum quod in ueritate inquantum est a parte Primi 
unumquodque est natum participare Ipsum, sed ex parte recipientium potest esse defectus. Nam nata est  
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on the differences and resemblances between human soul and angels.101 Of course the 
author is speaking here of the separated soul, he is then implying that man is mostly 
his soul. This can be due to the controversial gloss in the Ethica noua : “beatos homi-
nes ut angelos.”102 In any case, rational activity is what differentiates men from other 
creatures on earth103 and intellect is what we have similar to angels. 
Angels as well as the separated soul have special virtues : “some virtues are char-
acteristic of the separated soul and of the intelligences or angels (which is the 
same)”.104 In this reference the hierarchies among virtues are taken from Macrobius 
in his Commentary on the dream of Scipio.105 The theory comes from Plotinus, and 
through Porphyry is known by Macrobius. There are four levels of virtues : political 
virtues, purgative virtues, virtues of the purged soul and exemplar virtues.106 The au-
thor of the Guide for students asks why Aristotle does not consider the last two. Then 
our author assimilates what he calls virtutes consuetudinales with Macrobius’ politi-
cal virtues, and the virtutes intellectuales with Macrobius’ purgative virtues.107 
                                       
enim felicitas inesse diligentibus solum et affectantibus per amorem et cognitionem. Huiusmodi autem, que 
sic affectant Primum et diligunt, <sunt> solum due subtantie, scilicet homo et angelus.” 
101. Cf. LOTTIN, “L’identité de l’âme”, p. 192-193. Philip the Chancellor (PHILIPPUS CANCELLARIUS, Summa 
de bono, ed. WICKI, p. 85, 94-99) analyzes the differences between them according to the way in which 
they are illuminated by the First. 
102. AL, Ethica Noua, p. 88, 01a14-21. See above n. 39. 
103. Cf. PHILIPPUS CANCELLARIUS, Summa de bono, ed. WICKI, p. 42. 
104. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 102 : “Item : quare non agit de uirtute exemplari neque de illa que 
est purgatiua animi ? Determinat enim de talibus Macrobius. — Dicimus quod hic agitur solum de uirtute 
que acquiritur per operationes anime coniuncte corpori. Hec autem est proprie consuetudinalis, que fit in 
domando passiones sensibiles. Sed alie uirtutes que dicte sunt, sunt anime separate et etiam intelligentie uel 
angeli — quod idem est.” The fact that they are considering intelligences tells us that they are discussing 
this topic on natural philosophy, and that they were using the libri naturales and the methaphysics which 
were not yet “purged.” 
105. The theory of virtues of Macrobius was read all through the Middle Ages according to H. VAN LIESHOUT, 
La Théorie plotinienne de la Vertu. Essai sur la genèse d’un article de la Somme Théologique de Saint 
Thomas, Freiburg, Studia Friburgensia ; Paderborn, Bonifacius-Druckerei ; Paris, Librairie des jeunes, 
1926, p. 123-155. 
106. MACROBII AMBROSII THEODOSII, Commentariorum in somnium Scipionis libri duo, Introduzione, testo, 
traduzione e note a cura di L. SCARPA, Padova, Liviana Editrice, 1981, I, 8, 5 : “Sed Plotinus, inter philo-
sophiae professores cum Platone princeps, libro De virtutibus gradus earum vera et naturali divisionis ra-
tione compositos, per ordinem digerit. Quatuor sunt, inquit quaternarum genera virtutum : ex his primae 
politicae vocantur, secundae purgatoriae, tertiae animi iam purgati, quartae exemplares.” 
107. About the order of virtues see J. FLAMANT, Macrobe et le Néo-platonisme latin à la fin du IVe siècle, Lei-
den, Brill (coll. “E ́tudes préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l’Empire romain”, LVIII), 1977, p. 602-
607. Albert the Great will follow partially this interpretation but he will consider that the virtus purgati 
animi is the same as the virtus heroica in Aristotle. (Super Ethica, I. 7 lect. I, Ed. Colon.14/2, 514, 24-33 : 
“et hoc fit per divinam quandam et heroicam virtutem, per quam aliquis imitatur divinam aequalitatem 
secundum remotionem a perturbatione passionum. […] Et has virtutes vocat Macorobius purgati animi, 
quibus in divinam similitudinem ascendatur.”) In this manner Albert will consider the virtues of the purged 
soul as possible in this life. About this see J. MÜLLER, Natürliche Moral und Philosophische Ethik bei Al-
bertus Magnus, Münster, Aschendorff (coll. “Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des 
Mittelalters”, LIX), 2001, p. 192-197. A different consideration of Macrobius theory is found in HERVÉ LE 
BRETON, cf. C. LAFLEUR et J. CARRIER, “La Philosophia d’Hervé le Breton (alias Henri le Breton) et le re-
cueil d’introductions à la philosophie du ms. Oxford, Corpus Christi College 283 (Deuxième partie)”, Ar-
chives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge, 62 (1995), p. 359-442, see p. 384-385, § 35-37. An 
interpretation of this text can be found in C. LAFLEUR, avec la collaboration de J. CARRIER, “La Philoso-
phia d’Hervé le Breton (alias Henri le Breton) et le recueil d’introductions à la philosophie du ms. Oxford,  
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According to the master, as Aristotle only talks about moral and intellectual virtues, 
he will not talk about virtues of the purged soul and exemplar virtues which are both 
by definition, predicable only on the separated soul or angels. Again, the master is 
including the new theory within a scientific framework trying to incorporate all 
knowledge in a coherent system. 
The commentator of Paris also discusses this division of virtues. He concludes 
that Aristotle talks about human virtues, and that not all the virtues of which Mac-
robius talks are human. The exemplar virtues are not human, nor are the virtues of the 
purged soul because they belong to the soul that is already separated from the 
body.108 There is a different concept of human for the commentator of Paris and for 
the author of the Guide for students. The former considers man as a composite of soul 
and body, but the latter considers in this part that man is only or mostly the soul,109 
because it compares (resembles) men and angels. 
Kilwardby does not consider Macrobius’ division of virtues. According to him, 
Aristotle’s division is sufficient because “with the intellectual virtues one perfects the 
speculative intellect, and with the moral virtues one perfects the practical intellect”.110 
Evidently, he knew about the discussion found in the other texts because his claims 
can often be linked as a response to the other two masters. 
The discussion on virtues includes again the bipolar answer according to theolo-
gians and according to philosophers. It also includes the implication that the theory 
of happiness consisting in knowing the First can lead to the Aristotelian value of the 
intellectual virtues. Knowing is the operation of the intellect as well as an intellectual 
virtue. Nevertheless there is the opinion of theologians that virtues are infused in us 
by God. However, the most important fact is that philosophers in this case have the 
opposite opinion. The three texts considered here mention that virtue is a habitus that 
is originated in repeated actions, so it depends on man only. 
                                       
Corpus Christi College 283 (Première partie)”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge, 
61 (1994), p. 149-226, see specially p. 179-181. 
108. Commentary on Ethica Vetus, Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 3804a, f. 154ra : “Primo dubitatur de ista diuisione 
uirtutis. Et uidetur quod sunt insufficientes : quia Macrobius diuidit uirtutes in uirtutes exemplares, et in 
uirtutes que sunt purgati animi, et in uirtutes purgatorias et in uirtutes politicas. Et appellat uirtutes politicas 
uirtutes consuetudinales. Cum ergo auctor non tangat hic nisi duas species uirtutis ut dictas, uidetur quod 
insufficit diuidat uirtutem per intellectualem et consuetudinalem. Ad hoc dicendum est quod ista sciencia 
intendit Aristoteles solum de uirtute humana et non de aliis uirtutibus que non sunt humane. Et ideo cum 
omnis ille uirtutes quare nominat Macrobius non sint humane. Ideo non omnes tangit hic. Virtutes enim 
exemplares sunt uirtutes quibus cognoscitur primi essentia, et iste non sunt humane. Iterum uirtus que di-
citur purgati animi non est humana : quia ista uirtus que postquam anima separata est a corpore. Set uirtu-
tes politice sunt humane et uirtus purgatoria est humana, quia uirtus purgatoria acceditur in comparatione 
intellectus uel rationis ad superiora sicut uirtus intellectualis quare illam non oportuit hic determinare quia 
aprehenditur sub uirtute intellectuali.” (The orthography of the manuscript is kept.) 
109. In any case, our compiler will further compare men and angels. Later, it is asked whether it is necessary 
that the intelligences merit happiness through virtue like men. He will introduce then a theory of a twofold 
intellect for angels. (LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 105.) 
110. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 295ra : “et patet <quod> sufficit huius diuisionis considerando diuisionem 
intellectus per practicum et speculatiuum intellectuales enim perficiunt speculatiuum, morales (scr.] mor-
tales cod.) uero practicum.” 
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3. Happiness in Life 
The concept of happiness and its relationship with virtue has already been dis-
cussed. Related to this is the possibility of achieving happiness in this life or only af-
ter death. The author of the Guide for students asks whether happiness is achieved in 
this life or in the other life. He does not consider Aristotle’s classification of lives, 
namely life of pleasures, political life and contemplative life. He asks whether there is 
happiness before death. It might seem that there is ; since Aristotle says that there is 
happiness in life and life is before death, therefore there is happiness before death.111 
However, the master claims that life can be considered in two ways : one is life of the 
soul with the body, it is temporal and inconstant,112 and related to it there is no happi-
ness. There is also another life, in which soul lives knowing and loving the First and 
in this life there is happiness. Soul is most alive in itself after death, when it is sepa-
rated from body. Therefore, happiness is after death. The master considers that this is 
what Aristotle himself meant.113 According to him, Aristotle says that there is happi-
ness in life, but he means in the life of the separated soul. 
The master also asks whether the body can receive happiness like the soul. He 
answers that according to theologians the body can receive happiness because they 
establish that the soul and the body reunite after death. Philosophers do not establish 
this because it is a miracle, i.e. an unnatural event.114 Clearly, this question stresses 
the difference between philosophers and theologians. The master wants to define a 
kind of science possible here below (apud nos). Happiness can be investigated in a 
“human way”, i.e. in a philosophical way.115 Then according to philosophers, happi-
                                       
111. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 95 : “Gratia huius queritur utrum sit felicitas ante mortem. Et uide-
tur quod sic, quia, sicut dicit hic auctor, felicitas est in uita. Felicitas enim quedam uita dicitur. Sed uita est 
ante mortem, ergo et felicitas.” 
112. The fact that this life is subject to fortune is also considered in the Commentary of Paris. This is solved by 
Aristotle with the distinction between [eudaimon] happy and [makarios] blessed. (See above p. 457, n. 37) 
Nevertheless, the masters (except for Kilwardby) have not seen this difference. Hence they consider for-
tune as part or constituent of happiness. 
113. LAFLEUR, Le “Guide de l’étudiant”, § 95 : “Solutio. Dicendum quod duplex es uita : una scilicet in qua 
uiuit anima cum corpore, et hec est temporalis et inconstans, et ideo de tali non est felicitas ; est autem alia 
uita qua uiuit anima in se intelligendo et affectando Primum, et in tali est felicitas. Anima enim maxime 
uiuit in se post mortem, cum sit a corpore separata. Et ideo innuit hic Aristotiles felicitatem esse post mor-
tem.” 
114. Ibid., § 94 : “Item queritur utrum corpus sit natum recipere felicitatem sicut anima. Et uidetur quod sic, 
cum sit instrumentum per quod anima operatur bonum. Et ita uidetur corpus mereri sicut anima. — Ad hoc 
dicimus quod secundum theologos hoc habet ueritatem, quia ponunt animam reiungi corpori post mortem. 
Sed hoc est plus per miraculum quam per naturam. Simpliciter enim hoc est innaturale, et ideo non ponitur 
a philosophis. Et propter hoc cum felicitas sit post mortem, sicut probat hic auctor, et non ponunt philoso-
phi animam post mortem coniungi corpori, ideo proprie felicitas per naturam debetur solum anime et non 
corpori.” 
115. Ibid., § 84 : “Primum est utrum de felicitate potest esse scientia, et uidetur quod non. Felicitas enim est 
bonum spirituale, et de tali non potest esse certa cognitio apud nos, quia sicut uult Aristotiles in secundo 
Phisicorum, intellectus noster obscurus est et ebes ad nature manifestissima. Et dicit Commentator ibi quod 
per “manifestissima” dat intelligi spiritualia, que omnino separata sunt a motu et materia. Cum ifitur feli-
citas sit bonum spirituale, uidetur quod de ipsa apud nos non est certa cognitio, quare nec firma scientia. — 
Ad hoc intelligendum quod illud bonum dupliciter potest considerari : uno modo in relatione ad suam cau-
sam, et hoc modo de ipso non est scientia apud nos nec certa cognitio (uel si est, magis pertinet ad astro- 
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ness pertains only to the soul, and not to the soul re-united with the body after death 
as is the opinion of theologians. Kilwardby states a different interpretation of the 
same question. The happiness of the soul with the body after death is not to be stud-
ied by philosophy,116 because it does not pertain to this science whether after death it 
is the soul or the whole man that is happy, he keeps Aristotle and Ethics out of the 
question. This is in contrast with the claim of the Guide for students that philosophers 
should not establish that kind of happiness because it is something unnatural (innatu-
rale). Kilwardby only establishes boundaries to the object of the moral science, while 
the author of the Guide for students shows an opposition between opinions of phi-
losophers and opinions of theologians. Lafleur has noted that a similar proposition of 
Boethius of Dacia in De Aeternitate Mundi was condemned in 1277.117 
Kilwardby defends the interpretation of Aristotle according to which we can be 
absolutely happy in this life. “It is to be noted that Aristotle calls living persons truly 
good, because if they are not truly good they cannot be absolutely happy, and ac-
cording to him some living persons can be truly good and therefore absolutely 
happy.” Kilwardby is aware that there are other interpretations, and because of that, 
he considers that this is “against those who say that Aristotle means to attribute only 
an incomplete happiness for the living.”118 He may here refer to the “theologians” of 
the Commentary of Paris as will be seen. Happiness is possible in this life, according 
to Aristotle, Kilwardby claims. Moreover, he calls attention to the theologians’ opin-
ion that the philosopher only considered perfect or complete happiness after death. 
Kilwardby says “against” (contra), he is conscious that these theories are opposite. 
While he limits the field of philosophy to what occurs in this life, he will not consent 
to an “incorrect” interpretation of Aristotle. 
In the case of the Commentary of Paris, the discussion on the possibility of hap-
piness in this life begins when the author discusses the classification of lives of Aris-
totle : life of pleasure, political life and contemplative life. The commentator of Paris 
introduces a new kind of life : the life of the separated soul. This brings him to the 
                                       
nomiam) ; alio modo potest considerari felicitas ratione finis, et ita possunt cognosci eius proprietates per 
quas mouet ad operandum, et sic facit scientiam apud nos.” 
116. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 293va : “utrum enim post mortem felicitetur anima uel totus homo forte non 
pertinet ad ipsam <doctrinam civilem> nec hoc determinat Aristoteles.” 
117. Cf. LAFLEUR, “Les ‘guides de l’étudiant’ de la Faculté des arts”, p. 154, n. 36. Proposition 18 : “Quod 
resurrectio futura non debet concedi a philosopho, quia impossibile est eam investigari per rationem. — Er-
ror, quia etiam philosophus debet captivare intellectum in obsequium Christi.” (CUP, t. I, no 473, p. 544. 
For a new edition of the condemnation accompanied with a complete analysis see D. PICHÉ, La Condam-
nation parisienne de 1277, nouvelle édition du texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire par 
D. PICHÉ, avec la collaboration de C. LAFLEUR, Paris, Vrin (coll. “Sic et Non”), 1999, this proposition in 
p. 84). Boethius of Dacia says this in his book De Aeternitate mundi : “Cum ergo tu ipse dicis et dicere de-
bes multa esse vera, quae tamen, si non affirmes vera nisi quantum ratio humana te inducere potest, illa 
nunquam concedere debes, sicut est resurrectio hominum quam ponit fides”, in R. HISSETTE, Enquête sur 
les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277, Louvain, Publications Universitaires (coll. “Philoso-
phes médiévaux”, XXII), 1977, p. 309. 
118. Cambridge, Peterhouse 206, f. 293ra : “Et notandum diligenter quod uocat hic Aristotiles uiuentes uere 
bonos, quia si non est uere bonus nisi simpliciter felix, et secundum ipsum aliqui viuentes sunt uere boni, 
secundum ipsum aliqui viuentes sunt felices simpliciter : quod est contra eos qui dicunt Aristotilem uelle 
uiuentem felicitari nisi incomplete.” 
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discussion whether there can be happiness before death or only after death. Again, 
there are two answers, one according to theologians and one according to philoso-
phers. 
To show the answer of the theologians, first he presents the three kinds of life ; 
then he relates each of them to a kind of soul ; finally he considers which kind of life 
qualifies for achieving happiness. As happiness is perfect, the life to achieve it must 
also be perfect. However, he says that during life man is susceptible to bad fortune, 
so happiness is not in any kind of life as stated by Aristotle. Here it is evident that the 
author confuses “happiness” and “blessedness” ; because of that he considers this life 
imperfect.119 He relates perfection to fortune rather than to virtue. When he resumes 
the classification of lives, he concludes that in none of them can there be happiness, 
because none of them are perfect.120 Considering that none of those lives can achieve 
happiness, there has to be another kind of life in which perfect happiness is possi-
ble.121 This new kind of life is stated as the only one where we can be united with 
happiness. The only perfect life is that of the separated soul. Therefore, theologians 
say that only in the life of the separated soul can there be happiness : 
Ad hec est duplex respontio, et est prima hec. Auctor non sumit in ista diuisione omnes 
differencias uite et sic patet <quod> insufficienter procedunt predicta argumenta ; et sic 
patet quod non diuidit uitam inconuenienter. Posset enim de facili responderi ad predictas 
oppositiones quod de uita que est cum anima separata potest predicari felicitas et sic patet 
quod non sumit hic sufficienter modos ipsius uite. Et ista respontio est penes theologos.122 
The perfection that theologians are seeking cannot be found in earthly life. They 
are seeking the highest good, the First. The object of pursuit is much more important 
than the pursuer itself, man. So, as the commentator says, according to theologians, 
perfect happiness is given only in the life of the separated soul. In this way, another 
item is added to the previous configuration of lives.123 The Aristotelian division of 
lives appears incomplete in the eyes of theologians : contemplative life is not enough 
                                       
119. See above n. 112. 
120. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 115 : “Item auctor diuidit hic uitam in uitam uoluptuosam et 
ciuilem et contemplatiuam et dicit quod in hoc quod ponebant omnes uitam, uerum dicebant, set in hoc 
quod ponebant felicitatem esse uitam uoluptuosam aud ciuilem etc., errabant. Et uidetur quod nichil dicat, 
quia omnis uita aud est uoluptuosa aud ciuilis etc. ; ergo, si uita diuiditur in has, uita predicabitur de aliqua 
istarum, uita dico que est felicitas et in quam ponendo non errabant philosophi ; set uita uoluptuosa non est 
huiusmodi uita, quia uita uoluptuosa est cira diuicias, set ostensum <est> quod circa diuicias non est feli-
citas, et sic ista non predicatur de uita uoluptuosa. — Item, non predicatur de uita ciuili, quia uita ciuilis 
similiter est circa diuicias, per diuicias enim adquiruntur honores, et sic non predicatur uita que est felicitas 
de uita ciuili. — Nec de uita contemplatiua, quia uita contemplatiua est inperfectorum, quia sciencia et 
uirtus est inperfectorum, felicitas autem est perfectorum, et sic uita que est felicitas non predicatur de uita 
contemplatiua.” 
121. Ibid., p. 115-116 : “Item ad idem. Vita uoluptuosa et ciuilis sumuntur penes animam uegetabilem et 
sencibilem ; set secundum animam uegetabilem et sencibilem ; non unitur nobis felicitas ; et sic uita que 
est felicitas non predicatur de uita uoluptuosa nec de ciuili. Similiter nec de uita contemplatiua, quia uita 
contemplatiua est penes uirtutem et scienciam. Et sic uidetur quod predicta uita non possit diuidi in has tres 
uitas precedentes.” 
122. Cf. ibid., p. 116. 
123. Cf. G. WIELAND, Ethica-Scientia Practica. Die Anfänge der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert, 
Münster, Aschendorff (coll. “Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters”, 
Neue Folge, XXI), 1981, p. 147-148. 
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to bring happiness to man, therefore a new classification of lives will be necessary, 
where the life of the separated soul will be added. Perfect life enjoying felicitas 
would only be possible then after death.124 
Philosophers have another answer, and the Commentary of Paris states the alter-
native : a possibility of felicitas in this life (in ista uita). Philosophers do consider the 
possibility of predicating happiness on contemplative life. Contemplative life is de-
fined as a combination of virtue and knowledge that occurs following the structure of 
the soul. There are two intellects : speculative intellect and practical intellect. On one 
hand the speculative intellect125 constitutes two parts, a superior part, called agent 
intellect, that has no contact with inferior things (it knows in summa) and an inferior 
part, called possible intellect, which is fallible because it knows particulars and sin-
gulars (singullatim) using images provided by sense and imagination (phantasia). On 
the other hand, practical intellect126 implies a superior part that tends naturally to 
superior good, and an inferior part that tends to created goods. In the latter, failure 
can occur.127 One must determine, in accordance with this soul structure, how 
philosophers conceive the contemplative life where happiness occurs : 
Est autem alia respontio secundum philosophos et hec est respontio. Dicendum est quod 
uita in quam ponendo felicitatem non errabant philosophi predicatur de uita contempla-
tiua ; set dicendum est quod uita contemplatiua est secundum uirtutem et scienciam siue 
cognitionem ; set notandum quod duplex est cognitio : est enim quedam cognitio sine 
fantasmate et est quedam cognitio mediante fantasmate ; et illa uita contemplatiua que at-
tenditur penes scienciam et cognitionem que est sine fantasmate est de qua predicatur uita 
quam ponendo esse felicitatem non errabant philosophi. Similiter dicendum est quod uir-
                                       
124. Cf. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 116. 
125. The structure of the soul is described in ibid., p. 101-102 : “Aliter dicendum est quod, sicut in intellectu 
speculatiuo est duplex pars, scilicet pars superior et pars inferior, similiter in parte intellectu que uocatur 
pars desideratiua est duplex pars, scilicet pars superior et pars inferior. Illa enim pars speculatiui intellectus 
que est superior semper est recta, et illa pars uocatur intellectus agens, qui habet cognitionem omnium re-
rum in summa et indistincte ; […] et in cognitione huiusmodi intellectus non potest esse error. Est autem 
pars inferior que uocatur intellectus possibilis, et iste non est rectus semper, immo potest esse rectus et non 
rectus.” 
126. Ibid. : “Similiter dicendum quod pars intellectus practici superior desiderat et appetit et cognoscit, set ista 
cognitio est cum affectu, et istud desiderium et ista uoluntas semper sunt recta ; […] Est autem alia pars in-
ferior, et circa istam partem inferiorem partis desideratiue est libertas arbitrii ; […] tamen illam partem que 
est inferior et miscetur uirtutibus sensibilibus, possunt recte uelle et non uelle, et sic habent liberum arbi-
trium.” This framework is analyzed by ibid., p. 87, and by LOTTIN, “Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des 
arts de Paris”, p. 182-212. The latter analyzes ms. 3804a in that part devoted to Ethica Vetus, where the 
intellect framework is further developed. Another text, which may have influenced this, is De Anima et de 
potenciis eius, GAUTHIER, “Le traité ‘De Anima et de potenciis eius’”, p. 48-55 : De Potentia Rationali. 
127. Cf. LOTTIN, “Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des arts de Paris”, p. 189-190 : “Dicendum est quod du-
plex est habitus partis intellectiue. Quidam enim est habitus qui innascitur cum anima humana ; uerbi gra-
tia, humana anima secundum partem que uocatur agens habet cognitionem rerum in summa, et ista cognitio 
seu habitus innascitur cum ipsa anima ; item anima nascitur cum amore primi, et iste habitus seu istud de-
siderium est innatum ; et secundum huiusmodi habitus accipiendo intellectum, intellectus semper est rec-
tus. Si autem accipiatur in comparatione ad habitus acquisitos in ipso, tunc non semper est pars intellectiua 
recta, nec intellectus rectus, immo potest esse rectus et non rectus ; et hoc ultimo modo non semper est in-
tellectus practicus ad bonum ; et hoc modo necesaria fuit philosophia moralis ad uirtutem, et non fuit suffi-
ciens naturalis.” This fragment of the commentary on the Ethica Vetus is contained in the same manuscript 
as our commentary on the Ethica Noua (according to Gauthier they are fragments of the same commentary, 
cf. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 71). 
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tus potest esse in parte superiori desideratiua uel in parte inferiori ; et circa uirtutem se-
cundum quod est in parte superiori uirtutis desideratiue est uita de qua predicatur felicitas. 
Et sic patet quod uita que est idem felicitati predicatur de uita contemplatiua in quantum 
uita contemplatiua est circa cognitionem sine fantasmate et uirtutem que est circa partem 
superiorem intellectus practici siue uirtutis desideratiue.128 
Contemplative life must be developed according to virtue as it derives from the 
superior part of practical intellect (desiderative), and according to science that comes 
from the superior part of speculative intellect (the agent intellect). The concept of 
knowledge of the superior part of the speculative intellect implies a kind of knowl-
edge without images (cognitio sine fantasmate).129 Phantasia forms the images 
(phantasmata) from the data that senses provide. Being the possible intellect related 
to phantasia and so to the senses, it can be right or wrong. Only the knowledge of the 
agent intellect not involving images (phantasmata) will be always right. This kind of 
knowledge is provided by illumination. Then this cognitio sine fantasmate can be in-
terpreted as an illumination.130 The agent intellect (i.e. the superior part of the 
speculative intellect) can receive illumination from the First. As it receives the 
knowledge from the First, it would be knowledge that does not come from abstrac-
tion of the forms from the senses through the images (phantasmata). 
The possibility of knowledge without images (phantasmata) is given in De anima 
et de potentiis eius, but its structure of the soul is not the same as in the Commentary 
of Paris.131 Most strange is the fact that in the latter the agent intellect not only pro-
duces knowledge but also accepts knowledge, while in De anima et de Potentiis eius 
                                       
128. GAUTHIER, “Le cours sur l’Ethica Noua”, p. 116. 
129. LOTTIN, “Psychologie et morale à la Faculté des arts de Paris”, p. 190-191. (f. 153va.) : “Intellectus agens 
habet cognitionem rerum in summa ; unde dicit Boetius : summam retinet, singula perdit. Sic ergo patet 
quod intellectus agens non cognoscit res uel species rerum singillatim, et sic non potest facere cognitionem 
rerum singillatim in intellectu possibili ; et propter hoc oportet quod intellectus possibilis habeat aliunde 
cognitionem singulorum, et sic in habendo huiusmodi cognitionem comparatur ad phantasiam et sensus ; et 
sic contingit in ipso falsitas siue error. Sed non sic est a parte rationis imperantis uirtuti sensibili : ipsa enim 
ratio habet appetitus distinctos et cognitionem appetituum distinctam ; et ideo huiusmodi appetitus dis-
tinctus potest in sensum facere ; et ideo cum sensus et ratio sint in eodem, oportet quod sensus sit rectus, 
ratione existente recta ; non autem sic est a parte intellectus possibilis et agentis.” 
130. As in Paris, Bibl. Nat., lat. 3804a, f. 153ra (the orthography of the manuscript is kept) : “et dicendum est ad 
hoc quod anima humana habet duplicem partem speculativi intellectus, scilicet partem supremam que uo-
catur intellectus agens, et partem inferiorem et hec uocatur intellectus possibilis. Et intellectus agens plus 
recipit illuminationem a primo quam possibilis. Similiter est a parte partis motiue : in motiua enim parte 
anime humane, que uocatur pars desideratiua, est duplex uirtus seu pars, scilicet suprema et inferiora et su-
prema pars plus illuminatur a primo quam inferior pars. Et quia illa suprema pars maxime illuminatur a 
lumine primi influente. Ideo illa uirtus desiderativa quantum ad illam partem recte agit semper ; quantum 
ad partem inferiorem, non tantum illuminatur a lumine primi, et ideo potest ordinari ad recte et non recte 
operandum. Et hoc est causa quare intellectus humanus non semper quantum ad quamlibet sui partem est 
rectus ; set est in ipso possilibitas ad rectum et non rectum.” Also, (f. 153ra-rb) : “Intellectus enim huma-
nus defficit et quia pars inferior eius non omnino illuminatur a primo et quia est inclinatus ad fantasiam. Et 
propter hoc potuit magis peccare quam intelligencia. Intelligencia autem non habet nisi unum deffectum 
scilicet quantum ad partem eius inferiorem et non quia intellectus eius sit inclinatus ad fantasiam. Et ideo 
intelligencia non ficit (sic) tantum coacta ad peccandum sicut homo.” 
131. GAUTHIER., “Le traité ‘De Anima et de potenciis eius’”, p. 53-54 : “hic notandum est quod alique forme 
sunt in intellectu possibili quas non abstrahit intellectus agens a fantasmatibus, set anima adquirit eas per 
rectam operationem, sicut sunt iusticia, prudencia ; et alique sunt quas adquirit per superiorem illuminatio-
nem, ut quedam que intelliguntur de Deo et diuino modo.” 
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storing knowledge is only a task of the possible intellect. A very similar structure of 
the soul can be found in another commentary of the same period, known as the 
pseudo-Peckham commentary.132 Here the knowledge “not always right” is also 
linked with the fact that it knows through phantasia. The “pure” knowledge is not 
contaminated or does not come from images (phantasmata). The concept of happi-
ness implies then a whole theory of the soul and of knowledge. 
Happiness, according to philosophers, resides in knowledge of the agent intellect 
(as a part of human soul) ; and in virtue emerging from practical (desiderative) intel-
lect in its superior part, which is the general (in summa) desire for good. There is a 
possibility of human happiness. According to philosophers, happiness is possible in 
this life (in contemplative life). The contemplative life is described as a compound of 
knowledge (from speculative intellect) and virtue (from practical intellect). 
Summarizing, there are two answers, which make clear the difference between 
philosophers and theologians. Some scholars have neglected the second answer, i.e. 
the answer according to philosophers. At first glance one might think that it was only 
an answer with which the author would not agree. However, he is holding the same 
structure of the soul and explaining it carefully in several places in the text. In addi-
tion, he bases his theory of virtues on the same framework. Then one must consider 
that this is part of his thought, and that philosophers’ thought is actually his own. 
Perhaps he would even consider himself a philosopher. 
As has been noted, also in the question about when happiness is to be achieved, it 
is not clear what the position of the masters is. This is probably due to the readings 
that the masters used to interpret the Ethica Noua and Vetus and to the way in which 
they thought deeply, trying to make philosophy a coherent system of knowledge. 
V. CONCLUSION 
HAPPINESS ACCORDING TO PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS 
The study of early commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics is not only a phi-
losophical inquiry. The commentaries depended on and influenced in different ways 
the historical environment from which they sprang. As any historical event they re-
produce a number of practices. This reproduction is seldom perfect ; so there is some 
originality within this imperfection of the reproduction that may produce new prac-
                                       
132. Cf. LOTTIN, Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles, t. I, p. 514, the manuscript quoted is Florence, 
Bibl. Naz. Cent., conv. sopp. G4 853, f. 68vb : “Dico quod in anima rationali est duplex pars, inferior scili-
cet et superior : superior qua contemplatur superiora, inferior qua contemplatur et considerat inferiora. 
Cum ergo dicitur quod intellectus semper est rectus, hoc est quantum ad superiorem partem ; non hoc 
modo ratio est motor phantasie, sed solum quantum ad partem inferiorem est motor phantasie, et hoc modo 
non semper est rectus et propter hoc non procedit ratio. Aliter potest dici, sicut dicetur, quod intellectus 
agens cognoscat omnia, sed indistincte, cum autem illuminatur a phantasibus, tunc facit cognitionem dis-
tinctam in intellectu possibili ; similiter dico quod, cum dicitur quod intellectus est semper rectus, hoc est 
prout indistincte se habet circa omnia, set tunc non mouet phantasiam ; cum autem est circa singularia dis-
tincte se habens, tunc mouet phantasiam et tunc non est semper rectus ; et propter hoc mouet quandoque 
recte, quandoque non recte.” 
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tices. Indeed, the masters of Arts failed to restrict their own field of research to what 
the syllabus said. They chose instead to investigate the whole domain of knowledge. 
The masters of the Faculty of Arts produced a new philosophical field, when they 
reproduced imperfectly the boundaries fixed in the syllabus of what was allowed to 
be taught or used in the Faculty of Arts. The reason is that the texts they were sup-
posed to teach involved the knowledge of other banned texts, which were related to 
them. In any case, they tried to explain the texts and make of them a coherent theory. 
They considered the philosophical field as their own field ; consequently they would 
try to study as much philosophy as possible. In addition, they dared to study it be-
cause the danger of excommunication was no longer valid after 1231. In any case, the 
ecclesiastical authorities were against the use of philosophy not only by masters of 
Arts but also by masters of Theology. 
For some of the problems, philosophers and theologians had different answers. 
Secundum philosophos or secundum theologos, whatever the masters described, they 
always managed to get to the soul, to the intelligences, to the Prima Causa. Even if 
they could not teach natural philosophy itself, it was included in the courses on Ethics 
because it was necessary to grasp the text of the Nicomachean Ethics. What the texts 
show is that masters of Arts were studying philosophy and producing there own sys-
tem of knowledge before 1250 and that they were committed to their research. 
As for the concept of happiness before 1250, they sometimes disagreed with 
theologians, even if both were discussing philosophical issues, which were not al-
lowed for masters of Arts, and not advised for theologians. The masters discussed 
with theologians because they considered that they had the conceptual tools for this 
and, in the domain of knowledge, they did not accept the hierarchy imposed by the 
ecclesiastical authorities on the University. The masters were thinking, and they con-
sidered all possible answers to a question. If the answer of theologians did not satisfy 
them, they would keep searching for a more accurate answer. This has always been 
the task of philosophers. 
